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Abstract
The next stage of the digital economy will involve trillions of
networked devices across every industry and sphere of human activity:
The Internet of the World. Early manifestations of this evolution through
on-demand services such as Uber and Airbnb raise a host of serious legal
questions. The stage seems set for a decisive battle between regulation
and innovation. Yet this perception is mistaken. In the end, the emerging
businesses will welcome government engagement, and regulatory actors
will accept creative solutions to achieve their goals. Why expect such a
resolution? Because the same story played out twenty years ago, in the
early days of the commercial internet.
Contemporary debates recapitulate a familiar error: the artificial
division of virtual and real-space activity. Now, as in the past, this “digital
dichotomy” feeds both excessive skepticism about legal protections and
excessive concern about the threats from technology-based innovations.
The history of cyberlaw shows the importance of overcoming such
perceptions and recognizing the potential of government as an enabler of
innovation.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, the internet’s1 sphere of influence has
grown from a few million personal computers using dial-up modems to
billions of smartphones and broadband connections around the globe.2 It
is hard to imagine the internet becoming any more significant, even as
that significance grows. The next stage of the digital ecosystem will
involve trillions of networked devices, across every industry and sphere
of human activity: The Internet of the World. Early manifestations of this
evolution raise serious legal questions about regulatory classification,
taxation, consumer protection, and a variety of other controversies. 3 The
1. Although many style guides still capitalize the word “internet,” there is an ongoing
debate as to whether the term should be considered a proper noun. See Adam Nathaniel Peck,
Stop
Capitalizing
the
Word
Internet,
NEW REPUBLIC
(July 28,
2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/122384/stop-capitalizing-word-internet. In fact, the continued
capitalization illustrates one of the themes of this Article: the perception of the internet as a new
and exotic technology long after it became mainstream.
2. See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internetusers/#trend (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (showing global internet users growing from
approximately 25 million in 1994 to 3 billion in 2014).
3. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative
Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2015) (discussing regulatory issues in the sharing
economy); Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1068–

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/5

2

Werbach: The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Int

2017]

THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME

889

stage seems set for a decisive battle between regulation and innovation.4
Yet this perception is mistaken. In the end, emerging businesses will
welcome government engagement, and regulatory actors will accept
creative solutions to achieve their goals. Why expect such a resolution?
Because the same story played out twenty years ago, in the early days of
the commercial internet.
Three of today’s most-heralded technology trends—the On-Demand
(or Sharing) Economy, the Internet of Things, and Big Data—are actually
components of the same phenomenon. The digital economy is
increasingly incorporating systems, business processes, and objects into
its chaotic dynamism. Predictably, those involved claim that everything
is different now and that rules impeding their efforts are vestiges of
ignorance best ignored. Their customers, competitors, and erstwhile
regulators are not so sure. Debates increasingly rage over whether rules
designed for legacy industries should control novel services such as Uber
and Airbnb.
Both sides exaggerate the dangers. Progress requires recognizing that
government is as much the solution as it is the problem, perhaps more so.
Legal regimes exist to protect certain values. If those regimes fail, the
answer is not to abandon the values; it is to adapt the legal institutions or
develop new regimes more reliant on market forces, norms, or
technology. Regulation can evolve, but only once regulators and
regulated engage with one another in good faith. The longer the pattern
of oversteer persists, the greater the cost to innovation, on one side, or
societal values, on the other. If anything, the innovators stand to lose the
most by delaying government involvement in adopting reasonable
solutions. Leading on-demand providers are already beginning to
recognize this.

69 (2015) (discussing solutions to problems with regulation in the sharing economy); Stephen R.
Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 149
(2016) (discussing local government regulation of sharing economies); Abbey Stemler, Betwixt
and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 33 (2016) (discussing
how the sharing economy “does not fit within existing legal frameworks”); Molly Cohen & Corey
Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, BOS. B.J. (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-the-sharingeconomy/ (discussing legal issues raised by the sharing economy). See generally Benjamin G.
Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate
Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293 (2016) (discussing regulatory
frameworks associated with Airbnb and Uber).
4. See, e.g., Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 440–55 (2015) (advocating a new “innovation
law” approach to on-demand services).
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The pattern is easy to spot in hindsight but difficult to recognize in the
moment.5 Fortunately, history can serve as a guide. Retracing similar
controversies and showing their parallels to current disputes can
illuminate the pathway forward. It can also remind us of important
theoretical perspectives that bear on current debates. The early years of
internet commercialization were fertile ones not only for business
entrepreneurs but also for intellectual entrepreneurs in the legal academy.
In a seminal late-1990s exchange with Judge Frank Easterbrook,
Professor Lawrence Lessig argued that the nascent field of cyberlaw
could help identify both policy challenges and their solutions.6 The same
measures used to evaluate how technologies regulate, he asserted, could
be used to assess conventional legal mechanisms, guiding the selection
of the best approach in specific contexts.7 Lessig’s insight applies equally
well to the Internet of the World. Questions about regulating (or not
regulating) today’s innovative companies and business models parallel
debates about online activity twenty years ago. What is needed are
yardsticks to evaluate where government action should stop and private
regulation by software algorithms begin, and vice versa. Lessig’s
proposed criteria prove surprisingly durable, despite the massive changes
in the digital world.
This Article traces the road to balance on the major public policy
debates that began at the dawn of cyberlaw, roughly twenty years ago. It
demonstrates how the fundamental issues then are in fact the fundamental
issues now; only the players have changed. And it identifies how the
lessons of history—even recent history—can help overcome current
challenges. It proceeds as follows.8 Part I summarizes the emerging
trends shaping the next stage of the internet ecosystem, in particular the
spectacular growth of on-demand services such as Uber, Lyft, and
Airbnb. Part II recounts the birth of cyberlaw in the 1990s and explains
the structure of debates over the proper legal response to online services
5. The neo-Schumpeterian technology scholar Carlota Perez makes a similar argument
with a much broader scope, describing fifty-year cycles of economic, political, financial, and
social responses to major technological upheavals. See generally CARLOTA PEREZ,
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL (2003) (describing a pattern of boom,
bust, and renewal across five technological revolutions). Central to Perez’s framework is a
“turning point,” where the excesses of early exuberance are reined in with the help of regulation.
See id. at 114–26.
6. Compare Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (1999) (arguing that cyberlaw offers unique and valuable
perspectives), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 208 (arguing that “we do not know whether many features of existing law are
optimal”).
7. See Lessig, supra note 6, at 502–03.
8. The author begs the reader’s indulgence for naming the Article after a Led Zeppelin
album, while employing Beatles songs for the section headings.
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and e-commerce. Part III traces contemporary developments in four key
policy areas: regulatory classification, competition policy, taxation or
fees, and platform responsibility. Part IV draws out lessons for moving
toward healthy solutions for today’s policy challenges.
I. COME TOGETHER: THE INTERNET OF THE WORLD
The next stage of the digital economy does not yet have a widely
accepted name, but its outlines are well established. It is the
transformation of every form of economic activity along the same lines
as the internet. This phenomenon appears at the intersection of three
highly visible trends: the On-Demand Economy, the Internet of Things,
and Big Data. Each represents huge innovation potential and vast market
opportunities. Together they signify a global sea-change that will
penetrate every sector of the economy. Just as electronic commerce,
online communications, and digital content distribution transformed
markets beginning in the late 1990s, broadband and social networks in
the early 2000s, and mobile services in the late 2000s, the Internet of the
World will disrupt existing industries and create new ones. It will also
pose dramatic challenges for both business and the law.
A. Revolution on Demand
Providers in the On-Demand Economy use the internet to liberate and
aggregate spare capacity, through new platforms that respond to demand
in real time.9 For example, Turo (formerly RelayRides) lets people rent
out their cars, giving the owners some extra cash and renters access to a
wider range of rentals and pickup locations than car-rental fleets.10
Instacart delivers groceries from local supermarkets through a network of
part-time and independent workers.11 Prosper enables peer-to-peer (P2P)
9. See RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS xvi (2010); ROBIN
CHASE, PEERS INC 2 (2015); Russell Belk, You Are What You Can Access: Sharing and
Collaborative Consumption Online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595, 1595 (2014); Raj Kapoor, Lessons from
the Sharing Economy, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/30/criticallessons-from-the-sharing-economy; The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharingeconomy. A related development, most notable in China, is the growth of offline-to-online (O2O)
services. See Juro Osawa, Startups That Merge Online and Offline Services Are Sweeping China,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/04/04/online-services-gooffline-in-china.
10. Alex Konrad, With $47 Million and a New Name, Car-Sharing Startup RelayRides
Seeks Rebirth, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/
2015/11/04/with-47-million-and-a-new-name-car-sharing-startup-relayrides-seeks-rebirth/.
11. Brad Stone, Instacart Reclassifies Part of Its Workforce amid Regulatory Pressure on
Uber, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201506-22/instacart-reclassifies-part-of-its-workforce-amid-regulatory-pressure-on-uber.
Instacart
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lending without going through a traditional financial institution.12 And
the most prominent examples, Uber and Airbnb, offer immediate access
to local transportation and short-term lodging in cities around the world.13
These companies generally do not own the assets to which they offer
access. Instead, they create virtual marketplaces using the internet and
mobile devices.14
The trend is often labeled the Sharing Economy or Collaborative
Consumption,15 but these are misnomers. The sector’s significant
businesses are aggregate marketplaces of atomic services; little altruistic
sharing occurs.16 Uber drivers, for example, don’t just happen to be in the

originally used only independent contractors, but it recently reclassified some of them as
employees. Id.
12. See Michael J. de la Merced, Prosper Marketplace Raises $165 Million in Latest
Funding Round, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
04/09/business/dealbook/prosper-marketplace-raises-165-million-in-latest-funding-round.html.
13. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2017); UBER,
http://www.uber.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
14. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 9; cf. CHASE, supra note 9, at 3.
15. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 9, at xv; Belk, supra note 9, at 1595; The Rise of
the Sharing Economy, supra note 9.
16. See Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the
(Mar.
14,
2014,
7:43
AM),
Internet’s
Hottest
Businesses,
SALON
http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/sharing_economy_shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_inte
rnets_hottest_businesses/; Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the “Sharing” Economy
Wrong, WALL. ST. J. (May 24, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-getsthe-sharing-economy-wrong-14 32495921; Natasha Singer, Twisting Words to Make ‘Sharing’
Apps Seem Selfless, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/
technology/twisting-words-to-make-sharing-apps-seem-selfless.html; Brad Tuttle, Can We Stop
Pretending the Sharing Economy Is All About Sharing?, TIME (June 30, 2014), http://time.com/
money/2933937/sharing-economy-airbnb-uber-monkey parking/.
“On-Demand Economy” is one of the other terms growing in prominence to better describe
the phenomenon. See Jeff John Roberts, As “Sharing Economy” Fades, These 2 Phrases Are
Likely to Replace It, FORTUNE (July 29, 2015, 8:20 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/ 29/sharingeconomy-chart/. From a user’s perspective, the key innovation of Uber, Airbnb, and similar
services is that they make resources available instantaneously via mobile connections.
The true Sharing Economy is a real phenomenon. Non-profits, socially-oriented companies,
and governments promote digital systems that make it easier to share both goods and services.
See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 9, at xv; CHASE, supra note 9, at 2. However, these activities
are naturally smaller-scale than the corporate on-demand platforms that are ultimately dedicated
to maximizing revenues and profits. Real sharing requires thicker personal relationships, which
are harder to divorce from local geographies and personal interaction. See Yochai Benkler,
Sharing Nicely: On Sharable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic
Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 275–76 (2004). The growing prominence of on-demand
companies that are not truly about sharing has also provoked objections from organizations more
committed to the pro-social benefits of shared consumption. See Nancy Cook, In Search of the
Anti-Uber, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/ubersharing-economy-roots/400187.
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neighborhood with empty seats in their cars.17 The distinctive feature of
Uber is that anyone with a car can become a driver-for-hire on demand,
and anyone seeking a ride can get one on demand.
On-demand providers replicate the immediacy and rapid scalability of
e-commerce services such as Netflix or Amazon. Enterprises have done
similar things for many years within their sphere of control, through
enterprise resource planning and supply chain management software
systems. The innovation is that on-demand services are not limited to
assets they own or control. Instead of shipping some bits over a wire or
putting a box from a warehouse on a truck, these services can direct
otherwise-independent people and objects.
Using software and networks to manage physical assets, digital
systems can tokenize and manipulate real-world resources. The software
representation of the asset effectively becomes the asset. Noted venture
capitalist Marc Andreessen calls this phenomenon “software . . . eating
the world.”18 Early Facebook executive Matt Cohler, also now a venture
capitalist, refers to it as “remote controls for real life.”19 Touch a
computer-generated map on your smartphone, and in a few minutes, a
real car (with a real driver) appears in front of you in the real world.
So, companies such as Uber and Airbnb may be examples of another
oft-discussed technology megatrend: the Internet of Things.20 The
Internet of Things, or IoT, involves network connectivity for devices
other than personal computers, phones, and tablets.21 Most IoT
17. Unless otherwise noted, this Article focuses on the UberX service, which is the source
of the bulk of Uber’s revenue and activity. Uber has begun offering a carpooling service,
UberPool, which offers shared rides. However, it still uses drivers who, as with traditional taxis,
are specifically looking to pick up riders for a fee. See Alex, Announcing UberPool, UBER
NEWSROOM (Aug. 5, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/announcing-uberpool/.
18. Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460.
19. Matt Cohler, Great Mobile Apps Are Remote Controls for Real Life, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/21/great-mobile-apps-are-remote-controls-forreal-life/.
20. Others have made this connection, notably tech publisher and conference organizer Tim
O’Reilly. See Quentin Hardy, Tim O’Reilly Explains the Internet of Things, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2015, 7:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/ 02/04/tim-oreilly-explains-the-internet-ofthings/ (listing Uber as an example of an Internet of Things company).
21. See DAVE EVANS, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HOW THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THE
INTERNET IS CHANGING EVERYTHING 2, 4 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/
innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf; William H. Dutton, The Internet of Things 4 (June 20, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324902; Neil
Gershenfeld & JP Vasseur, As Objects Go Online: The Promise (and Pitfalls) of the Internet of
Things, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140745/neilgershenfeld-and-jp-vasseur/as-objects-go-online; Charles McLellan, M2M and the Internet of
Things: A Guide, ZDNET (Jan. 10, 2013, 9:27 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/m2m-and-theinternet-of-things-a-guide.
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discussions focus on small “things” such as sensors, environmental
monitors, wearables, and medical devices, or on making large industrial
systems such as supply chains and power grids “smart.”22 But the core
idea is more than this. IoT means turning anything not traditionally a
computing device into a network-aware source of data collection or
manipulation.23 That aggregates individual devices into networked
systems, which in turn can shape their actions.24 As with the On-Demand
Economy, this process is experiencing phenomenal growth rates. Cisco
predicts that by 2020, there will be 50 billion non-computing devices
connected to the internet, many times the number of PCs and
smartphones.25
In the case of Uber and Airbnb, the “things” being manipulated are
cars and lodgings. They are not directly connected as with networked
sensors; a smartphone or tablet serves as the interface that links the
physical asset into the network, with a human in-between. From the
user’s standpoint, however, this distinction is immaterial, and the
companies hope to eliminate that inefficiency before long. Uber has
partnered with Carnegie Mellon University to develop self-driving cars,
a technology other companies such as Google and Tesla are also actively
pursuing.26
The final element undergirding both the On-Demand Economy and
the Internet of Things is Big Data.27 There are two components to the Big
Data revolution.28 The first is the assembly of massive data sets of
22. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98 (2014)
(overviewing types of Internet of Things devices, including “health and fitness sensors,
automobile black boxes, home monitors and smart grid sensors, devices designed specifically for
employee monitoring, and software applications that make use of the sensors within today’s
smartphones”).
23. Dutton, supra note 21, at 4.
24. Id. at 9–10.
25. See EVANS, supra note 21.
26. Jack Stewart, Tesla’s Self-Driving Car Plan Seems Insane, but It Just Might Work,
WIRED (Oct. 24, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/teslas-self-driving-car-planseems-insane-just-might-work/; Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, Uber Chases Google in
Self-Driving Cars with Carnegie Mellon Deal, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2015, 10:23 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/ 02/02/uber-chases-google-in-self-driving-cars//.
27. Gil Allouche, Big Data and the Internet of Things: A Powerful Combination,
SMARTDATA COLLECTIVE (June 4, 2014), http://smartdatacollective.com/gilallouche/202371/bigdata-and-internet-things-powerful-combination.
28. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 19 (2013); see also
Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html?_r=0 (introducing the concept of Big Data
as “[a] meme and a marketing term, for sure, but also shorthand for advancing trends in technology
that open the door to a new approach to understanding the world and making decisions”).
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information about people and the world, thanks to the steady acceleration
of digitization through the eras of mainframes, personal computers,
mobile devices, and sensors.29 A key foundation for this activity is the
emergence of cloud computing and networked data centers that can
process vast amounts of data within the network.30 The second is the
emergence of software, storage, and standards able to distill and analyze
those data sets as a whole.31 The “big” in Big Data signifies that instead
of the statistician’s traditional sample sets, entire data sets can be run
through computer-driven algorithms, generating predictive models that
find patterns in networks of correlations.32
The use of Big Data is important because the massive number of
distributed connections embodied in the Internet of Things, tied to
important societal systems through the On-Demand Economy, generates
enormous amounts of data.33 Tracking a fleet of cars in a city in real time
and anticipating changes in demand and supply to deliver a car to any
location on demand in a few minutes is a phenomenally difficult
challenge. Uber could not manage it without powerful real-time data
analytics. The more physical location is involved, and the more telemetry
and behavioral data are incorporated along with it, the greater the
technical challenge but also the more powerful the services that can be
delivered.
Companies taking advantage of the three interconnected trends are
experiencing unbelievable growth.34 Roughly five years after it launched,
Uber is the world’s most valuable private company, raising its latest
funding round at a valuation of $62 billion.35 It now operates in over 300
cities worldwide and has over one million drivers in its network.36 Its
revenues are already in the billions of dollars and may hit $12.5 billion in
29. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 28, at 19.
30. See id. at 30.
31. Id. at 19.
32. See id. at 31.
33. See Allouche, supra note 27; Hardy, supra note 20.
34. See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES
(Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-theunstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/; The Sharing Economy: How Will It Disrupt Your
Business?, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Aug. 2014), http://pwc.blogs.com/files/sharingeconomy-final_0814.pptx (predicting that five key Sharing Economy sectors could grow from
$15 billion today to over $300 billion in revenues by 2025).
35. See Mike Isaac and Leslie Picker, Uber Valuation Put at $62.5 Billion After a New
Investment Round, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/04/business/dealbook/uber-nears-investment-at-a-62-5-billion-valuation.html.
36. See Luz Lazo, Uber Turns 5, Reaches 1 Million Drivers and 300 Cities Worldwide.
Now What?, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/drgridlock/wp/2015/06/04/uber-turns-5-reaches-1-million-drivers-and-300-cities-worldwide-nowwhat/.
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2017.37 Airbnb is not far behind. Its valuation in its latest funding round
exceeds $25 billion,38 and it has grown to over one million rooms
worldwide, which is more than traditional hotel chains such as Marriott
and Hilton provide.39 There are also several substantial ride-hailing40
competitors to Uber, including Lyft in the United States and Didi
Chuxing in China, which are also valued in the billions of dollars.41
These providers are changing the way millions of people around the
world find transportation and lodging. Some no longer own cars or stay
in traditional hotels. And similar techniques are appearing in industry
after industry. The brand council Crowd Companies tracks over 500
funded companies in what it terms the Collaborative Economy.42 They
operate in fields including financial services, communications, business
services, pre-owned goods, and logistics.43
The potential scale of on-demand services is much greater than the
legacy industries they challenge. In January 2015, Uber’s ride-hailing
service was generating revenue in San Francisco at a $500 million annual
run-rate, more than three times the size of the entire taxi industry in the
city.44 By changing the nature of the marketplace, on-demand services
37. See Here’s What a 2017 Uber IPO Could Look Like, MAHESH VC (Nov. 14, 2016),
http://www.mahesh-vc.com/blog/heres-what-a-2017-uber-ipo-could-look-like. As a private
company, Uber does not report detailed financial information. Id. These numbers are based on
selective information the company has disclosed in the past, plus leaked investor presentation
materials. Id.
38. See Sara Ashley O’Brien, “Crazy Money”—Airbnb Valued at over $25 Billion,
CNNMONEY (June 27, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/27/technology/airbnbfunding-valuation-update/.
39. See Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are Quiet, for
Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/airbnb-growsto-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for-now.html.
40. Just as labeling on-demand services as sharing is a misnomer, the common designation
of Uber and Lyft as “ridesharing” is less accurate than “ride-hailing.” See Caitlin Huston, Drivers
with Uber, Lyft and Rival Ride-Hailing Services Are Mostly 51 or Older, MARKETWATCH (Jan.
19, 2017, 7:20 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/study-most-ride-hailing-drivers-are-51or-older-2017-01-18.
41. See Benjamin Snyder, This Ride-Sharing App Is Crushing Uber in China, FORTUNE
(June 26, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/26/china-uber-didi-kuaidi/; Brian
Solomon, Lyft: We’re Closing in on Uber with a ‘Path to Profitability,’ FORBES (May 12, 2016,
10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/05/12/lyft-were-closing-in-onuber-with-path-to-profitability/#b90513e464ec.
42. See Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2—Watch It Grow, CROWD COMPANIES,
http://crowdcompanies.com/blog/collaborative-economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2017).
43. Id.
44. See Henry Blodget, Uber CEO Reveals Mind-Boggling New Statistic That Skeptics Will
Hate, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-san-francisco2015-1.
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create new demand. And the impacts are not limited to the customer side.
Millions of people around the world are becoming providers through
these platforms, experiencing a new form of on-demand work. A
February 2016 survey in the United Kingdom found that twenty-one
percent of respondents (projecting to nine million people in the United
Kingdom) had looked for work through on-demand platforms in the past
year.45
To understand the impact that on-demand services can have on
business and public policy, it is important to view these services as a
subset of a larger trend, which sweeps in other kinds of companies as
well. Uber’s enormous valuation, for example, reflected investors’ belief
that it would leverage its data and software-controlled network of cars to
monetize services other than ride-hailing, which it is attempting through
local delivery.46 Similarly, IoT companies such as Google subsidiary
Nest, which makes connected thermostats and smoke detectors,47 and
Fitbit, which makes connected exercise monitoring bracelets,48 are most
significant because of the potential applications of the data they collect
and their ability to direct actions in the physical world.
When a refrigerator can re-order groceries falling into short supply, or
a GPS route planner can avoid congested areas while directing a driver
across town, the lines between sharing, on-demand, data analytics, and
connected devices blur. At some level, virtually any resource that can be
disaggregated or modularized is a candidate for on-demand sharing, and
45. See URSULA HUWS & SIMON JOYCE, UNIV. OF HERTFORDSHIRE, CROWD WORKING
SURVEY: SIZE OF THE UK’S “GIG ECONOMY” REVEALED FOR THE FIRST TIME 1 (2016),
http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/a82bcd12-fb97-43a6-9346-24242695a183/crowd-workingsurveypdf.pdf.
Using a different methodology, a study released in March 2016 by J.P. Morgan Chase
concluded that 4.2% of American adults had earned income from the “online platform economy”
over a three-year period. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE
PLATFORM ECONOMY 8 (2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/
jpmc-institute-volatility-2-report.pdf. While this is significantly smaller than the UK estimate, it
still represents approximately 10 million people. Id. And the J.P. Morgan Chase study found the
number of participants in the online platform economy increased tenfold from the beginning of
the period in 2012 to its end in 2015. Id.
46. See Maya Kosoff, Here’s the Only Way Uber Can Justify Its $41 Billion Valuation,
BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-only-way-uber-canjustify-a-41-billion-valuation-is-delivery-and-logistics-2015-7 (“The only way Uber can prove a
valuation as massive as $40 or $50 billion is by expanding into delivery and logistics, allowing
its fleet of drivers to move goods in addition to people.”). There is no guarantee Uber will succeed.
Even if it does not, networked ride-hailing services will continue to seek ways to take advantage
of their informational and software assets to expand their footprint.
47. See Rolfe Winkler & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google to Buy Nest Labs for $3.2 Billion,
WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303595404579318952802236612
(last updated Jan. 13, 2014, 6:46 PM).
48. FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
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virtually any physical asset is a candidate to function as both sensor and
actuator for cloud-based software-driven systems.49
Services such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb are on the leading edge of
something much bigger. They took root first and represent important
developments in their own right. This Article highlights how they have
already kindled significant legal and regulatory controversies. However,
just as Amazon was far more than a disruptive entrant in the bookstore
market, today’s on-demand services offer only a taste of what is to come.
B. The Next Wave for Business . . . and for Law
The confluence of On-Demand, Internet of Things, and Big Data is
producing shockwaves that will ripple through the global economy, in the
same way that electronic commerce, digital content, social networks, and
online services did in prior stages of internet development. Today, even
though only a small minority of retail commerce and advertising occurs
online in the United States,50 few would disagree those sectors have been
radically destabilized and reconstructed. As with earlier transformations,
the Internet of the World will unfold over many years, but its scope and
significance are difficult to overestimate.
Yet for all the great potential of these developments, there is a catch.
New services that restructure relationships among buyers and sellers,
workers and managers, or consumers and producers tend to raise
significant legal and regulatory concerns. When business models fail to
line up with the animating assumptions of the law, confusion and
opposition inevitably result. Sometimes the opposition comes from
industries challenged by the new upstarts, who they argue are competing
unfairly by ignoring settled legal obligations. Sometimes, it comes from
governmental actors or advocates worried about erosion of legal
protections or tax revenues. To name just some of the issues,
controversies have arisen about the legality of on-demand services under

49. Of course, that extreme endpoint will not ever be reached, both because of technical
and cost limitations, and because of human resistance to excessive automation and control. And
the diffusion process, as with any major technological shift, will be bumpy and in some areas
slower than anticipated.
50. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, e-commerce sales represented 6.8% of total retail
sales in the third quarter of 2015. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE
SALES: 4TH QUARTER 2016, at 2 (2016), https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/
ec_current.pdf. Digital advertising represented 28% of the U.S. total in 2014. See Kenneth
Olmstead & Kristine Lu, Digital News–Revenues Fact Sheet, in STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2015,
at 17, 18 (2015), http://www. journalism.org/2015/04/29/digital-news-revenue-fact-sheet/.
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local and state laws,51 responsibility for taxes and fees,52 data privacy,53
consumer protection requirements,54 compliance with the Americans
with Disabilities Act,55 anti-competitive practices,56 discrimination,57 and
the legal status of workers.58
Such conflicts are inevitable with significant technology-fueled
market transformations. There will always be winners and losers. And the
new providers run differently than those operating when the existing legal
or regulatory arrangements were drawn up. The stakes in these situations
are high, and not just in terms of allocating economic rents. Significant
and hard-won protections for workers’ rights, consumers, competition,
and other important values may be undermined. On the other side, the
potential multiplier effects downstream may stifle innovation.
As predictable questions came to the fore, many on-demand startups
and their cheerleaders reacted by opposing any government
involvement.59 When Hillary Clinton, during her 2016 presidential
campaign, stated that the On-Demand Economy is “creating exciting
economies and unleashing innovation” but “also raising hard questions
about work-place protections and what a good job will look like in the

51. See, e.g., Douglas MacMillan, Uber Laws: A Primer on Ridesharing Regulations,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015, 10:37 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/29/uber-laws-aprimer-on-ridesharing-regulations.
52. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 3, at 35; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing
Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1026 (2016).
53. See Peppet, supra note 22, at 143–44.
54. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 3, at 35; Katz, supra note 3, at 1113.
55. See Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disability Laws Don’t Apply to Us: Is Uber Letting Its
Drivers Dodge The Americans With Disabilities Act?, DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2015, 5:15 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/21/uber-disability-laws-don-t-apply-to-us.html.
56. See Katz, supra note 3, at 1091–92; Erica Fink, Uber’s Dirty Tricks Quantified: Rival
Counts 5,560 Canceled Rides, CNNMONEY (Aug. 12, 2014, 3:11 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/uber-fake-ride-requests-lyft/.
57. See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence
from a Field Experiment 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-069, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701902.
58. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Katz,
supra note 3, at 1104.
59. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN ET AL., THE SHARING ECONOMY AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION REGULATION 5 (2014); Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable
Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, RICH. 21
J.L. & TECH. 6 1 (2015) (urging “policymakers to allow [IoT] technologies to develop in a
relatively unabated fashion”); Arun Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate
Itself, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/
03/trusting-the-sharing-economy-to-regulate-itself/?_r=0.
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future,”60 she was pilloried for standing in the way of innovation to please
retrograde constituencies.61 Yet a closer examination shows that these
“hard questions” need to be considered, and in some cases, addressed
through government action. And the startup community itself is
beginning to acknowledge that the process of engaging with government
is more than an unfortunate necessity;62 it can be the surest means to
preserve and extend opportunities for innovation and further growth.
This pattern should not be surprising. It was exactly what happened
the first time internet-based platforms began to transform industries and
create huge new markets. Twenty years ago, a wave of startups such as
Netscape, eBay, Yahoo!, and Amazon burst onto the scene with
hyperbolic growth rates and dramatic impacts on established industries.
Legal and regulatory controversies were not far behind.
II. “IT WAS TWENTY YEARS AGO TODAY . . .” LESSONS FROM THE
DOT-COM ERA
The legal tensions of the Internet of the World are not new. The
previous waves of internet development did not go nearly so far in
blurring the lines between online and offline activity because they were
anchored in personal computers and smartphones. Yet despite those
limitations, the innovations of internet-based online services, electronic
commerce, and digital content distribution, beginning in the mid-1990s,
represented a connection between the virtual and physical worlds at a
scale never before seen. The resulting confusion gave birth to an array of
legal and regulatory conflicts, centered fundamentally on the relationship
of physical-world governments and the emergent realm of cyberspace.
The tensions between traditional regulatory obligations and technological
innovations seemed intractable—until they weren’t.
The internet that computer scientists developed in the 1970s and
1980s was for research and government uses, not commerce and
consumer applications.63 And then, suddenly, everything changed. In
1993, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications released
60. Arun Sundararajan, The ‘Gig Economy’ Is Coming. What Will It Mean for Work?,
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/26/will-weget-by-gig-economy.
61. David McCabe & Tim Devaney, Hillary Clinton’s Uber Problem, HILL (July 24, 2015,
6:01
AM),
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/248999-hillary-clintons-uber-problem;
William McGurn, Uber Crashes the Democratic Party, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2015, 7:48 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-crashes-the-democratic-party-1437436110.
62. See, e.g., Arika L. Pierce, The Startup’s Guide to Government Relations, STARTUP
GRIND, https://www.startupgrind.com/blog/the-startups-guide-to-government-relations-1/ (last
visited Mar. 15, 2017).
63. The Invention of the Internet, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/inventions/
invention-of-the-internet (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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software engineer Marc Andreessen’s Mosaic, the first graphical web
browser.64 Shortly thereafter, the National Science Foundation privatized
the internet backbone, removing the last restrictions on commercial
traffic.65 In 1995, Netscape went public with a spectacular first-day
valuation of nearly $3 billion.66 The internet economy was off and
running.
Around the same time, academics and others puzzled over the legal
implications of the newly opened realm of “cyberspace.” It was a heady
period, with startups such as eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo! getting off the
ground amid the economic boom of the roaring nineties. Not long before,
H. Ross Perot ran for President in 1992 advocating “electronic town
halls” as a new form of direct democracy.67 And the Clinton-Gore
Administration that took office the following year trumpeted the potential
of a National Information Infrastructure or “information
superhighway.”68 Wired Magazine debuted in January 1993, declaring
that “the Digital Revolution is whipping through our lives like a Bengali
typhoon.”69

64. See JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN 236–37 (2000).
65. See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention
into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2001) (describing the privatization
process); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on
Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 111–12 (2001) (describing the NSFNet
privatization); Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1256–57 (2007)
(explaining how privatization set the framework for internet interconnection).
66. See Devon-Ritchie, Netscape, One of the First World Wide Web Browsers, Goes Public
and Doubles in Value on Its First Day of Trade, FAMOUS DAILY,
http://www.famousdaily.com/history/netscape-goes-public.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
67. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Governing by Television, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/07/opinion/abroad-at-home-governing-by-television.html;
Perot’s ‘Electronic Town Hall’ Woudn’t Work, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/21/opinion/l-perot-s-electronic-town-hall-wouldn-t-work592592.html.
68. See generally NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVES: VISION AND
POLICY DESIGN (Brian Kahin & Ernest J. Wilson eds., 1997) (referring to the Clinton
Administration’s National Information Infrastructure initiative); Brian Kahin, The Internet and
the National Information Infrastructure, in PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE INTERNET 3, 3–23 (Brian Kahin
& James Keller eds., 1995) (discussing the “information infrastructure”); Al Gore, Vice
President, Information Superhighways Speech (Mar. 21, 1994), http://vlib.iue.it/history/internet/
algorespeech.html (using the term, “information superhighways”).
69. Andrew Leonard, Wired: The Book, SALON (Aug. 20, 1998, 3:00 PM), http://www.
salon.com/1998/08/20/featureb_12/.
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In hindsight, the level of excitement and the financial valuations of
many dot-com startups far exceeded their real impact in the 1990s.70 The
internet was accessible only to those with personal computers, on slow
and intermittent dial-up connections. It was almost entirely an American
phenomenon. So many of the infrastructural components of today’s
global internet economy, from mobile smartphones to cloud computing
platforms to social networks to open source software stacks, did not yet
exist. Yet many of the massive success stories of today trace their roots,
either directly or by imitation of ideas hatched before their time, to that
original Cambrian explosion of startups.
This period of technological and business innovation was also a fertile
time for legal innovation. As the size and significance of the digital
economy grew, legal and regulatory conflicts became increasingly acute.
The initial thrust of the new wave of startups was toward new unregulated
spaces. In time, though, the action shifted. Where the leading voices of
the digital economy at first thought they could avoid government
involvement, they began to recognize the inevitability of law and
regulation playing a significant role. And then, many began to support
government action as the best means to preserve openness and business
opportunities. This shift was not universal, nor did the evolution always
follow the same chronology. However, the pattern was unmistakable.
A. Idealism: Government as Anachronism
The leitmotif of the time was that technology could free communities
from traditional instruments of centralized governments. In 1994, author
Howard Rheingold, an influential theorist of cyberspace, published The
Virtual Community, suggesting that users could define their own rules
and develop rich social fabrics online.71 Writer Kevin Kelly’s Out of
Control appeared the same year, describing the potential of distributed
social and technological systems to self-regulate in the manner of
biological systems.72 Four influential futurists released a “Magna Carta
for the Knowledge Age” calling for “repealing Second Wave laws” to
realize the potential of the new era.73

70. Investors eventually agreed. The collapse of the dot-com bubble in 2000 wiped out
trillions of dollars of stock-market value. Amir Sufi & Atif Mian, Why the Housing Bubble Tanked
the Economy and the Tech Bubble Didn’t, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 12, 2017, 6:03 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-housing-bubble-tanked-the-economy-and-the-techbubble-didnt/.
71. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 268 (1994).
72. See generally KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL 100 (1994) (comparing computerized
technologies to living things).
73. See Esther Dyson et al., Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the
Knowledge Age, 12 INFO. SOC’Y 295, 296 (1996).
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This was the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, when images of individuals swarming over the Berlin Wall to
proclaim their freedom were fresh in everyone’s mind. The
entrepreneurs, developers, and investors who flocked to Silicon Valley
and other startup hotspots knew exactly who were the freedom fighters
of the future and who were the doddering hulks of the past.
Thus, while some considered how territorial law might regulate online
activity, unsurprisingly, many of the leading lights of the era thought that
territorial law should not control. Among the first shots across the bow
was a polemic from John Perry Barlow, former Grateful Dead lyricist and
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a public interest
group promoting digital rights. Barlow’s “Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace” inveighed against the notion that territorial
sovereigns had any rights to govern cyberspace.74 It was grandiloquent
and short on substance, but it struck a nerve. Over the remainder of the
1990s, several legal academics made common cause with Barlow,
developing various concepts of online self-governance.75
The dot-com bubble was inflating at the same time as these legal
developments. Netscape’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) opened the
floodgates to a series of startups whose massive market capitalizations
seemed out of step with their tiny revenues and non-existent profits.76 The
more the naysayers dismissed the “New Economy,”77 the bigger the
valuation numbers grew, in many cases surpassing iconic brick-andmortar brands.78 As one example, Priceline, which at the time of its initial
public offering reported $35 million in annual revenue and a net loss of
$114 million, was worth more than United, Continental, and Northwest
Airlines combined.79 If the old ways of building and valuing companies
were being left behind, why not the old ways of regulating them?

74. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
75. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1004 (1994); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1388 (1996); David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43
WAYNE L. REV. 155, 166–67 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making
in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 919 (1996).
76. See Devon-Ritchie, supra note 66; John Shinal, Netscape: The IPO That Launched an
Era, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 5, 2005, 6:05 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/netscape-ipoignited-the-boom-taught-some-hard-lessons-20058518550.
77. KEVIN KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY 1 (1998).
78. Id. at 98–99. At least until the bubble popped in 2000.
79. See Saul Hansell, Business Travel; Priceline.com Stock Zooms in Offering, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/31/business/business-travel-pricelinecomstock-zooms-in-offering.html.
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The “cyberlibertarians” made two kinds of arguments: descriptive and
normative. They claimed that government could not feasibly regulate
online services could not because the internet did not recognize national
or other political boundaries.80 Its technical architecture moved packets
dynamically from router to router, often using different paths for portions
of the same connection, with no regard to the physical location of any
waypoint along the journey. In fact, the internet was engineered to do so.
In the words of technologist John Gilmore, “The [internet] treats
censorship as damage and routes around it.”81 Unlike other
communications and media networks, it had no central management
point. Governments might issue an order against a website or an Internet
service provider, but if that entity was not physically located within their
borders, they could neither enforce the decree nor stop the flow of
packets.82
The other dimension of the argument was that even if states and
private litigants could bring online activity to heel, they should not.
Cyberspace had a right to be left alone, to govern itself.83 It was not just
technologists and radical scholars who sang this tune. The White House
under President Bill Clinton issued a white paper in 1997 titled, “A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” which expressed as its
first principle that “the private sector should lead” in the development of
online commercial activity.84 While not actually endorsing the
cyberlibertarian program (it was, after all, a policy report issued by the
U.S. government), the Framework cemented the rhetorical preeminence
of the “hands-off” regulatory approach in this period.
At first, it seemed as though such idealistic approaches would carry
the day. The opening battle in the legal wars over cyberspace regulation
was a rout for the anti-regulatory upstarts. Concerned about a potential
flood of digital pornography, Congress incorporated the Communications
Decency Act (CDA)85 into a massive 1996 overhaul of U.S.
communications laws, prohibiting indecent or obscene speech online.86
80. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1368.
81. RICHARD ROGERS, THE INTERNET TREATS CENSORSHIP AS A MALFUNCTION AND ROUTES
AROUND IT?: A NEW MEDIA APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF STATE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 243
(2009),
http://www.govcom.org/publications/full_list/Rogers_in_Parikka_Spam_book_optimized.pdf.
82. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1371–72.
83. Id. at 1402.
84. THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 4 (1997). The
Author was part of the team that developed the Framework while serving as Counsel for New
Technology Policy at the Federal Communications Commission.
85. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified in scattered sections of 18
and 47 U.S.C.).
86. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012).
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Cyberlibertarians were outraged. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) regulates indecent content on broadcast media such
as television and radio, but the internet, cyberlibertarians argued, is
different. Online activists and companies, including the largest webbased services of the day, turned their web pages black in protest.87
Groups such as the EFF mobilized against the law, which they believed
would chill online speech and business innovation.88 Barlow’s
“Declaration” was in fact penned in direct response to the CDA’s passage
as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.89
In Reno v. ACLU,90 decided in 1997, the Supreme Court upheld a
lower court ruling and invalidated the CDA on First Amendment
grounds.91 The vote was unanimous. The outcome seemed to presage an
era in which online communities might, as legal scholars David Post and
David Johnson promoted in an influential Stanford Law Review article,
develop their own rules outside of those tied to territorial borders.92 Those
who wanted a family-friendly environment could choose digital
communities with more restrictive content policies; governments should
not be deciding the character of cyberspace as a whole.93 To the
cyberlibertarians, Reno warned of what would happen when territorial
states tried to meddle in non-territorial cyberspace.
B. Realism: Government as Bully
The cyberlibertarian perspective soon provoked a contrary view from
self-styled “cyber-realists.”94 They claimed that even if the online world
87. See Anthony Collings, Home Pages to Go Black in Protest, CNN (Feb. 7, 1996),
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9602/cyber_censors/index.html; Peter H. Lewis, Protest,
Cyberspace-Style, for New Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/
02/08/us/protest-cyberspace-style-for-new-law.html. A similar protest more than a decade later
was influential in defeating the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act and Protect IP Act (SOPA-PIPA)
in Congress. See Hayley Tsukayama & Sarah Halzack, Web Sites Go Dark in SOPA
Protest Against Plans to Ban Online Piracy, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/web-sites-go-dark-in-sopa-protestagainst-plans-to-ban-online-piracy/2012/01/18/gIQAmWfD8P_story.html?utm_term=.2
f179de48f41.
88. Parker Higgins, The Web’s First Blackout Protest: The CDA, 20 Years Later, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/webs-first-blackoutprotest-cda-20-years-later.
89. See Barlow, supra note 74.
90. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
91. Id. at 885.
92. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1367.
93. Johanna M. Roodenburg,“Son of CDA”: The Constitutionality of the Child Online
Protection Act of 1998, 6 COMM. L & POL’Y 227, 256–57 (1998).
94. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 208 (proposing that regulators develop a “sound
law of intellectual property,” and then apply it to cyberspace); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
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created different contexts for legal disputes, and debates over
extraterritorial extension of state power, the fundamental issues involved
were not new, nor were the solutions.95 The cyber-realists found the
cyberlibertarian dream of disregarding or sweeping away traditional legal
structures hopelessly naïve.96 They predicted that whatever rhetorical
victories the cyberlibertarians might achieve, established governments
and legal systems would assert themselves when needed to govern online
activity.97 To the realists, power is what matters. And governments,
sometimes prodded by interest groups, are still the ones who wield it.
While the cyberlibertarians celebrated the dawning of a new era of
freedom and innovation, others worried. Established companies and
legislators saw danger in the rise of certain online services, especially
those challenging media and content industries.98 The CDA was an early
example, but not the only one. In fact, John Perry Barlow and technology
entrepreneur Mitch Kapor created the EFF to defend digital rights in
1990, even before the commercial internet took off, in response to
intrusive law enforcement actions against software providers and private
online services.99 The cyberlibertarian view that cyberspace heralded the
withering away of state power was disproven even before it became
prominent.
The cyber-realists, for the most part, did not attack the digital
economy. They recognized that it could create new opportunities for both
business and free expression. Instead, they criticized the view that the
growth of cyberspace implied an escape from historical legal and
governance mechanisms.100 The Reno decision overturned a bad law; it
did not suggest anything about other laws without the same constitutional
infirmities. And the border-crossing dimension of digital activity was no
more challenging than garden-variety international commercial
transactions, which spawned pragmatic legal innovations such as

Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1244 (1998) (arguing that “national and international
regulations of cyberspace transactions are legitimate and feasible”).
95. Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 1201.
96. EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 318 (2011).
97. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 452 (2000) (exploring various areas where
state intervention in cyberspace may be warranted).
98. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 130 (2001).
99. See A History of Protecting Freedom Where Law and Technology Collide, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about/history (last visited Mar. 27, 2017); see also
Mitchell Kapor, Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 265 SCI. AM. 158, 158 (1991).
100. See generally Netanel, supra note 97 (discussing governmental involvement in
cyberspace regulation).
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international arbitration.101 Activity online, the realists asserted, could be
regulated, should be, and would be.
Within a decade, the evidence was clear: the cyber-realists were
vindicated. In case after case, state actors and private litigants pierced the
veil of cyberspace.102 And as internet start-ups went public and grew into
large global businesses, with tens of thousands of employees and vast
physical and financial assets, it became both harder and less common for
them to insist on fundamental differentiation from other companies.103
In a seminal example, Yahoo! bowed to demands from a French court
that it remove Nazi memorabilia from its online auction site, even though
the servers involved were in the United States, where the transaction was
clearly protected under the First Amendment.104 If governments cared
enough about enforcement, they were often able to get their way,
especially as major internet companies increasingly did business—and
therefore had business reasons to respond—in many countries around the
world.105 Predictions that governments could not ever control their
citizens’ online speech were belied when China implemented an effective
network of filters across all of the links connecting its internal internet
traffic with the rest of the world.106 These efforts to reintroduce political
borders to the internet are imperfect but enough to refute the
cyberlibertarian contention that states are impotent to restrict online
activity beyond their borders.107
Perhaps the most influential case illustrating the law’s power to tame
cyberspace was the fate of Napster, the pioneering music-sharing service.
Few companies garnered so much interest and excitement so fast, and few
were extinguished so quickly by legal action.108 Napster’s blaze of glory

101. See Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 1246.
102. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 180–81 (2006).
103. Id. at 5–8.
104. See Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1349 (2001) (noting that “[f]ew cyberlaw cases have
attracted as much attention as the Yahoo! France” decision).
105. See Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders: National Boundaries Have
Survived in the Virtual World—and Allowed National Laws to Exert Control over the
Internet, LEGAL AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2006), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February2006/feature_goldsmith_janfeb06.msp.
106. See ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE
461 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2010); Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 105.
107. See James Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset,” ATLANTIC (Mar. 2008),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/andldquothe-connection-has-beenresetandrdquo/6650/.
108. The Napster brand was sold and reconstituted for a licensed music service after the P2P
system was shut down. However, it never regained a fraction of its prior scale. Michael Gowan,
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ended ignominiously, as the courts declared its business model of
enabling direct sharing of copyrighted content to involve contributory
copyright infringement.109 Even though Napster had influential
champions in the legal academy110 as well as financial support from
powerful venture capitalists and Bertelsmann (one of the major record
labels),111 it could not operate without the sanction of the legal system.
Today, the late-1990s clarion calls for a cyberspace that governed
itself, beyond the reach of “weary giants of flesh and steel,”112 are taught
mostly as historical curiosities. The internet boom is seen as a story of
wealth creation and innovation within the real economy, not an
alternative to it. The watchword of post-2000 startups is “disruption,”
implying the new will take the place of the old, not merely offer a
different path.113 In this rhetorical framing, the failure of the self-styled
New Economy lay in its refusal to engage the Old Economy, based on a
vain belief that it could simply ignore the past.114 Yet this account misses
a critical element. Amid the conflicts between cyberlibertarians and
cyber-realists emerged a third thread, which affirmatively sought out
government involvement in shaping the future of cyberspace.
C. Post-Realism: Government as Solution
The cyber-realists rejected the notion of a self-governing digital
sphere, but that did not mean government had any special role in online
activity. From their perspective, cyberspace was not special: it was no
more inherently open, innovative, or creative than other environments.115
It was only of interest to regulators where there were spillover effects in
the physical world, as when defamatory speech in an online forum caused
injury to real people.
Requiem for Napster, PC WORLD (May 18, 2002, 12:17 PM), http://www.pcworld.idg.com.
au/article/22380/requiem_napster/.
109. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
Napster file-sharing service guilty of contributory copyright infringement).
110. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 131 (2001).
111. See JOSEPH MENN, ALL THE RAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN FANNING’S NAPSTER
160 (2003); Stefanie Olsen, Record Labels Sue Napster Investor, CNET (Apr. 22, 2003),
http://www.cnet.com/news/record-labels-sue-napster-investor.
112. Barlow, supra note 74.
113. See CLAYTON CHRISTIANSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (2013). Technology industry proponents have widely bastardized
Christiansen’s disruption theory to equate any new startup as good and any established company
or industry as bad. See Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine.
114. See Lepore, supra note 113.
115. MOROZOV, supra note 96, at 320.
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Those who saw something valuable and unique in the new online
environment originally viewed government as the greatest threat to its
vitality. Soon, however, dangers appeared from other quarters. In these
situations, government authorities were the best hope for preserving the
dynamism of cyberspace, against threats from private actors or other
governments.116 The realists were right: sovereign power still mattered.
Yet they were wrong in thinking its only application was in the physical
world. The turn to government as a facilitator and guarantor of digital
dynamism is the most underappreciated aspect of the dot-com era.117
Historical examples in which significant segments of the internet
community welcomed government action included the Microsoft
antitrust case, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, and network neutrality.
They all date to around 1998, a few years after the first flood of internet
enthusiasm among analysts and markets but still early in the trajectory of
the digital economy.
1. Microsoft
The first great turn toward government as a solution was the
Department of Justice’s antitrust case against Microsoft. At the dawn of
the internet era, Microsoft cast a long shadow over the nascent online
environment. It dominated the personal computer industry, with its
Windows operating system enjoying over 90 percent market share and its
Office application software not much behind.118 Virtually all personal
devices accessing the internet ran Windows (Apple was then a non-factor
and smartphones did not yet exist), and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer
browser quickly became the dominant application for accessing the
World Wide Web.119
In 1998, the U.S. government sued the software company, claiming
that it was illegally tying other products to its dominant Windows
operating system.120 The trial court agreed, and the Justice Department
116. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 102, at 129.
117. The failure to appreciate the enabling role of government in the digital economy
parallels a similar blind spot regarding the networking infrastructure of the internet. See generally
Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (noting that the
FCC has, for the most part, been a positive driving force in the technology sector).
118. See Jamey Keaten & John Frederick Moore, US Targets Microsoft, CNNMONEY (May
18, 1998, 8:01 PM), http://money.cnn.com/1998/05/18/technology/microsoft_suit. In 1998,
Microsoft was briefly the world’s most valuable company by market capitalization. See Jay
Greene, For a Few Minutes, Microsoft Is World’s Most Valuable Company, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept.
5, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19980905
&slug=2770248.
119. Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case, 1 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE
7, 22 (2001).
120. United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000); Economides, supra
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pressed for a breakup of the company into application and operating
system providers.121 Government intervention in Microsoft’s business
practices, especially the claims based on Microsoft’s actions toward
online services, represented a huge move to shape the trajectory of the
internet market.
Many companies saw the Department of Justice intervention as
essential to competitive opportunities on the digital frontier. In particular,
Netscape, then the most prominent startup of the World Wide Web era,
actively promoted and assisted the investigation.122 Its outside lawyer,
Gary Reback, became the face of anti-Microsoft advocacy, organizing a
coalition of technology companies to argue in favor of antitrust action.123
The companies believed that an unchecked Microsoft would use its power
to prevent the internet from emerging as a truly open environment for
innovation.124
Thus, the arguments for action against Microsoft paralleled the
arguments against government regulation of indecent online speech or
P2P file-sharing technology: preserve the internet as a space where any
company could succeed and any individual could express herself. There
were clear analogies between the Microsoft case and the U.S.
government’s last great antitrust crusade in network industries, the
breakup of the AT&T telephone monopoly.125
Support for the government’s case against Microsoft was far from
universal among internet companies. Many feared that once government
could shape competitive arrangements in the software industry, it would
not stop with Microsoft. The level of endorsement, however, showed that
the story of cyberlaw was not as simple as it first seemed. The proponents
of an open and unconstrained internet environment might achieve their
goals through the means of government action, rather than limits on it.
note 119, at 10.
121. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
122. See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust
Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing
Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 94 (2007) (explaining how a Netscape
white paper played a key role in prodding the Department of Justice to act).
123. Reback later wrote a book expanding on this thesis. See generally GARY L. REBACK,
FREE THE MARKET! (2009) (arguing for government intervention in the free market). More
recently, he has pushed for antitrust action against Microsoft’s current nemesis, Google. See
James Temple, Antitrust Bulldog Gary Reback Pushes Google Probe, SFGATE (Jan. 24, 2011,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Antitrust-bulldog-Gary-Reback-pushesGoogle-probe-3161423.php.
124. See Temple, supra note 123.
125. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created
Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999); Philip J. Weiser,
Regulating Interoperability: Lessons From AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J.
271, 273 (2010).
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In the end, the government’s action against Microsoft was more
influential than it might outwardly appear. President George W. Bush
took office in 2001, and his administration quickly settled with Microsoft,
abandoning the structural remedies the Clinton Administration had
sought.126 From that point forward, however, Microsoft was a subtly
different company. Its patina of invincibility had been marred, and its
culture began to rein in the kinds of practices that had earned it the
government’s attention.127 Microsoft invested significantly in its legal
and government affairs operations. Newer companies such as Google,
which grew up in the aftermath of the Microsoft case, did not wait to
make similar investments.128 They recognized that engagement with
government was necessary, and potentially beneficial, even at relatively
early stages of their development.129
2. The Internet Tax Freedom Act
Please forward this to everyone you can...
There is a new bill in the US Congress that will affect ALL
INTERNET USERS. CNN stated that the Government
would in two weeks time decide whether to allow or not
allow a Charge to YOUR phone bill equal to a long distance
call each time you access the internet.
This affects us all! We cannot allow this to happen! Please
visit the following URL and fill out the necessary form to let
your Congressman know how you feel! The address is
126. See Timothy F. Bresnahan, A Remedy That Falls Short of Restoring Competition, 16
ANTITRUST 67, 67 (2001); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Informs
Microsoft of Plans for Further Proceedings in the District Court (Sept. 6, 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8981.pdf.
127. See Sharon Pian Chan, Long Antitrust Saga Ends for Microsoft, SEATTLE TIMES (May
11,
2011),
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/long-antitrust-saga-ends-formicrosoft; Nancy Gohring & Grant Gross, End of an Era: Microsoft Antitrust Oversight Ends,
IDG NEWS SERV. (May 11, 2011), http://www.computerworld.com /article/2507961/enterpriseapplications/end-of-an-era--microsoft-antitrust-oversight-ends.html; John Heilemann, The Truth,
the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2000),
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/8.11/microsoft_pr.html (“The humbling of Microsoft is
the last great business story of the 20th century and the first great riddle of the 21st.”).
128. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Learning from Microsoft’s Error, Google Builds a Lobbying
POST
(June
20,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpEngine,
WASH.
dyn/content/article/2007/06/19/AR2007061902058.html.
129. Ironically, Google is now being accused of anti-competitive practices, and the company
most aggressively lobbying antitrust authorities to take action is none other than Microsoft. See
Danny Hakim, Microsoft, Once an Antitrust Target, Is Now Google’s Regulatory Scold, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/technology/microsoft-once-anantitrust-target-is-now-googles-regulatory-scold.html.
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http://www.house.gov/writerep/. Write your representative!130
Ever since the 1990s, warnings such as the one above have circulated
about an FCC “modem tax” on computer users. The issue originated with
a 1983 FCC decision that computer-based “enhanced services” were not
subject to interstate access charges that local telephone companies
required long-distance carriers to pay.131 The FCC repeatedly denied its
intent to impose a modem tax.132 Nonetheless, alarm that government
actors might see online activity as a lucrative new source of revenue was
instructive.
It should not be surprising that taxation concerns were among the first
public policy fights to arise around the internet. Taxation and fees are the
primary means by which governments fund their operations. If certain
categories of activity are exempt from tax obligations, it puts pressure on
government budgets. This is especially true in the United States today, in
an era of deficit spending, with significant political opposition to any new
revenue generation and an increasing share of the budget devoted to nondiscretionary entitlements. Taxation can also significantly affect
competition. If the government taxes some competitors in a market and
does not tax others, those subject to the tax may be disadvantaged
artificially. Compounding the issue, the smaller the taxpayer base, the
more each must pay to generate a constant level of revenue. And if in
response to the price imbalance, customers shift to the un-taxed
providers, the tax-base erosion accelerates.
There are tens of thousands of taxing jurisdictions in America.
Rejection of the cyberlibertarian claim that cyberspace is nowhere
potentially means that it is everywhere, within striking distance of all of
them. The only surefire way to keep all those government authorities
from sinking their claws into online activity was through government
action in the opposite direction.
In 1998, Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA)133 for
the first time. At a time when economic activity online was still tiny
relative to brick-and-mortar transactions, Congress preemptively cut off
130. Internet Access Charges, SNOPES, http://www.snopes.com/inboxer/pending/
internet2.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2008).
131. See MTS & WATS Mkt. Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711–22 (1983).
132. See The FCC, Internet Service Providers, and Access Charges, FCC (Apr. 3, 2002),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Factsheets/ispfact.html. The issue actually
did not involve government charges or taxes at all but fees exchanged among private carriers.
133. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–719 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151
(2012)). The ITFA had a sunset clause. Congress subsequently extended it many times, before
finally making it permanent eighteen years later. See Alan Fram, Congress Bans Local Internet
Taxes, POST & COURIER (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.postandcourier.com/business/congressbans-local-internet-taxes/article_ecea2976-de9b-5ba0-bbf8-c8b4931c8403.html.
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the ability for states and localities to raise revenues or protect incumbent
businesses by targeting local sources of digital transactions.134 The
arguments in favor of such a step were the same ones the cyberlibertarians
voiced: the internet was a great space of opportunity for innovation and
creativity, which the entanglements of political actors should not weigh
down.135 Only this time, it was politicians arguing that positive
government action was needed to preserve the dynamic internet.
The ITFA bars only discriminatory taxes on online services.136 A tax
or fee that applies equally to equivalent online and offline conduct is not
forbidden. The challenge for any local or state taxing authority, however,
is how to establish a nexus between its jurisdiction and the online actions
being taxed.137 The most prominent example are sales taxes. If a customer
buys a book at a Barnes & Noble bookstore in Manhattan, that transaction
is subject to city and state sales taxes. If the customer, while standing in
the bookstore, pulls out a smartphone and buys the identical book from
Amazon, it is not subject to such taxes, because the transaction does not
occur in New York.138
For some time, the conflict was between Amazon’s view that sales tax
should never apply to its transactions and states’ argument that it always
should. As with the broader cyberlaw debate, Amazon’s objections to
collection of sales tax were both normative and practical. It complained
of the unfairness of serving as a tax collector for states and localities
where it did not operate.139 And it argued that it could not possibly keep
track of and apply the hundreds of different tax rates in the jurisdictions
it ships to.140
Over time, both Amazon and its opponents have been willing to
compromise. Amazon now collects sales tax for transactions involving
134. See Fram, supra note 133.
135. See, e.g., Nancy Weil, Senate Passes Internet Tax Freedom Act, CNN (Oct. 9, 1998,
11:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9810/09/nettax.idg/.
136. JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43772, THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM
ACT: IN BRIEF 1 (2016).
137. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317–18 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210–12
(1960).
138. See Brian Fagan, Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Avoiding an Inroad upon
Federalism, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 465, 481–82 (2001); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 425, 462 (1997).
139. On the other side, proponents of online sales taxes argued that Amazon had an unfair
advantage over local retailers, and its failure to collect sales taxes drained necessary state and
local revenues. See Amelia Landenberger, How Battles over Collection of Sales Taxes on Online
Sales Will Affect Small Businesses—Especially Affiliates of Large Sellers Like Amazon.com, 7
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 225, 232 (2012).
140. See id. at 230.
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customers in almost half of U.S. states.141 Contrary to predictions, this
has not caused big problems for Amazon.142 An all-or-nothing battle over
taxation of electronic commerce has thus given way to a situation in
which much is taxed, much of the time, but the growth of e-commerce
has proceeded apace. The affirmative step of federal legislation, with the
support of e-commerce providers, was a significant factor in this result.
The ITFA both avoided overlapping and excessive internet taxation when
it would have been most damaging and created breathing room for
negotiations.
3. Network Neutrality
The recognition of government’s potentially constructive role in the
digital economy reached its zenith with the push for network neutrality
rules against discrimination by broadband access providers.143 Debates
about the power of broadband providers to foreclose innovation began in
the late 1990s with the unsuccessful fight for open access to early cable
broadband systems.144 Law professor Tim Wu introduced the term
“network neutrality” in 2003, refocusing the effort from physical access
to non-discrimination rules.145 Now it was startups and internet-focused
academics who were advocating government action, and more
established companies, such as the incumbent telecommunications
141. See Greg Bensinger, Which States Make You Pay an Amazon Sales Tax, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 1, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/states-that-make-amazon-pay-sales-taxes1412185657.
142. Rich Smith, Amazon’s Sales Tax Move Changed Everything . . . and Nothing,
DAILYFINANCE (Apr. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/04/29/amazonssales-tax-move-changed-everything-and-nothing/; see also Christina Le, The Honeymoon’s Over:
States Crack down on the Virtual World’s Tax-Free Love Affair with E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. BUS.
& TAX L.J. 395, 408 (2007) (“Most e-businesses that exist solely in cyberspace, or are
incorporated in only one state but sell nationwide, have taken advantage of the stringent standard
and operated for many years without paying state sales and use taxes.”).
143. See Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 383, 384–
89 (2007); Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 331–34 (2007).
144. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 929 (2001); Kevin
Werbach, The Architecture of Internet 2.0, RELEASE 1.0, Feb. 1999, at 10. The open access debate
began in 1998 with AT&T’s acquisition of TCI, the largest cable operator, and its broadband
access systems. Opponents of the merger urged the imposition of open access conditions to allow
competing internet access providers to offer broadband service through the TCI platform. See
James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 77 (2000).
145. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 141–44 (2003); see also Werbach, supra note 65, at 1238–43 (distinguishing
interconnection and non-discrimination approaches to network openness).
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carriers, issuing warnings about going too far in “regulating the
internet.”146
The network neutrality movement was built on the premise that online
services were inherently dependent on other private actors, most notably
the operators of the physical networks used to access and transport data
on the internet.147 If a broadband access provider discriminated against
unaffiliated content providers or exacted a high access fee to reach its
customers, allowing online providers to define their own rules was not a
solution. One of the reasons the cyberlibertarian vision of the unregulated
internet worked was that the participants had traditionally adhered to a
set of norms that prevented classic economic hold-up behaviors.148
Adherence to these norms was partly cultural and partly reflected the
competitive dynamics in the early Internet.149
By the mid-2000s, both of those factors changed. Broadband access
providers were descended from telecommunications companies, not
internet startups, so their business values did not necessarily reflect those
of the network engineering community that gave birth to the internet.150
And for both the online services and access provider market, a few
companies became so dominant that they could make demands that others
felt compelled to accept.151 In such an environment, government action
was seen as the only way to alter the behavior of these players.152
Entrepreneurial technology startups weighed in aggressively in the
debate, primarily in favor of stronger rules placing greater limits on the
broadband providers.153

146. The argument for network neutrality rules is not necessarily inconsistent with the earlier
anti-regulatory spirit. Network neutrality proponents are concerned about private power limiting
free expression and competition, not just public power. See Jasper P. Sluijs, From Competition to
Freedom of Expression: Introducing Article 10 ECHR in the European Network Neutrality
Debate, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 510 (2012).
147. See Van Schewick, supra note 143, at 337; Wu, supra note 145, at 148–49.
148. See Phillip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529,
534–35 (2009).
149. See id. at 534.
150. See id. at 535.
151. See John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband
Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 92–93 (2009).
152. See id. at 93–94.
153. See Julia Boorstin, Why Start-Ups Are Also Against the FCC’s Net Neutrality Proposal,
NBC NEWS (July 15, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/why-start-upsare-also-against-fccs-net-neutrality-proposal-n156526; Gerry Smith, Tech Startups May Be the
Last Line of Defense for Net Neutrality, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2014, 12:49 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/02/net-neutrality-tech-startups_n_5247506.html.
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The network neutrality debate rages on.154 Over time, however, its
focus has shifted. The conflict no longer centers on whether broadband
access providers may discriminate in arbitrary ways against services and
applications on their networks. The providers themselves now accept that
some discriminatory practices are harmful to competition and
innovation.155 The idea that government has a role to preserve the vitality
and openness of the internet has become well-established, even if the
specifics of that role remain controversial.
D. Insights from History
An outline can be distilled from this brief history of twenty years of
cyberlaw. Debates followed a common pattern: oscillation between calls
for self-regulation or “unregulation”156 on the one hand and clumsy
efforts to impose excessive regulation on the other, eventually giving way
to accommodations in which government played more of a convening,
legitimizing, and enforcing role than a rule-setting one.
From an historical perspective, the predictions that the internet and
electronic commerce would have dramatic economic and social effects,
eventually becoming pervasive in much of the world, proved accurate.
The issues legal scholars raised from the internet’s earliest commercial
growth, such as intermediary liability and intellectual property
protection, have proven to be significant challenges to this day. Progress
occurred not when government sat on its hands but when legal and

154. See Brent Kendall, Appeals Court to Hear Arguments over FCC’s Net-Neutrality Rules,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-to-heararguments-over-fccs-net-neutrality-rules-1438640757 (discussing the pending legal challenge to
the FCC’s early 2015 decision); Rebecca R. Ruiz, F.C.C. Sets Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/technology/fcc-releases-net-neutralityrules.html (describing the FCC’s latest network neutrality rules, which involved reclassification
of broadband access as a regulated telecommunications service).
155. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, Surprise! We Agree with the President’s Principles on Net
Neutrality: Reiterating Our Strong Support for the Open Internet, COMCAST VOICES (Nov. 11,
2014),
http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/surprise-we-agree-with-the-presidentsprinciples-on-net-neutrality-reiterating-our-strong-support-for-the-open-internet (claiming that
Comcast supports network neutrality).
156. While it might be natural to refer to the position opposing government obligations on
internet-based services as deregulatory, that would be something of a misnomer. The desire to
avoid excessive regulation of nascent and innovative internet-based technologies was certainly
consonant with the deregulation trend that had dominated administrative law in the United States
since the 1980s. However, because internet-based services were generally not regulated to begin
with, it is more appropriate to use a term coined by former FCC attorney Jason Oxman, in an
agency white paper: unregulation. See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the
Internet (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 31, 1999),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
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regulatory actors took the initiative to institute reforms focused on
universal goals rather than particular historical artifacts.
Government engagement with innovative new markets and industries
can serve a number of positive goals.157 These include legitimizing new
business models, facilitating competition in cases of market failure,
increasing trust in new services by setting baselines and remedies,
restraining other government actors from harmful decisions, and
eliminating situations in which vague or overlapping obligations create
difficulties for new entrants. Government can also take an affirmative
stand in favor of innovation or new entrants, such as by delaying
imposition of requirements that would otherwise apply or imposing
limitations on established firms that might crush them.
Each of the case studies involves a different form of government
action. The Microsoft antitrust case involved remedial intervention to
protect consumers and a well-functioning market. The ITFA was a
preemptive strike against excessive claims by other government actors.
And network neutrality involved direct economic regulation. The internet
companies that supported these actions did not give government a blank
check to do as it pleased in cyberspace; they endorsed specific actions to
fix specific problems. Taken as a whole, though, these developments and
others like them showed a newfound tolerance for legal and regulatory
solutions.
III. THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: LAW AND THE NEW NEW ECONOMY
The dot-com startups of the 1990s and those of today’s Internet of the
World face similar policy challenges, playing out in a similar pattern.
Reflexive and restrictive government action can—and has—put a damper
on innovation, wealth creation, and new services with major consumer
and societal benefits. On the other hand, sometimes markets left alone
create sub-optimal results, either measured in formal economic welfare
terms or by societal values such as innovation and equity. And sometimes
government action must kick-start markets themselves.
From an economic standpoint, regulation is a second-best solution to
maximize welfare in cases of market failure, such as monopolization,
informational asymmetries, and externalities.158 As public-choice
theorists have pointed out, regulation is also subject to political
economies that can lead regulators to privilege the desires of interest

157. See Ranchordás, supra note 4, at 30.
158. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–17 (1982)
(discussing the efficacy of regulation in theory); 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1971) (same).
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groups or regulated incumbents.159 Regulation optimized for legacy
industries can stifle innovation if it blocks or unfairly disadvantages new
entrants.160 However, regulators can just as easily design regimes that
allow for and even promote innovation as a positive value.161
The development of the digital economy in its first decade shows how
initial skepticism about government, and the view that government was
an unchanging exogenous factor, gave way as situations arose in which
government involvement was valuable or even necessary. The Microsoft
antitrust case, the ITFA, and network neutrality were all cases in which
significant segments of the technology industry came down on the side
of direct government action. There is no reason to believe the pattern will
be any different for the On-Demand Economy and the other emerging
digital market segments today.
None of this is to suggest that regulators are always right.
Governmental actors are fallible, subject to political forces, and often
stuck with imperfect policy implements. Regulators frequently make hard
choices. For example, views differ about whether the FCC’s network
neutrality rules are a victory or defeat for innovation.162 It is telling,
however, that most of the startups and smaller internet-based services
providers that weighed in actively supported stronger FCC rules.163 The
important point is that the debate has moved from one about whether the
FCC should take interest in discriminatory practices of broadband
providers to how, when, and under what circumstances it should act.
The story for the new digital ecosystem is playing out very similarly
to the past. Many legal and regulatory flashpoints are emerging.164 The
initial debate framing is whether to regulate, with each side making dire
predictions about consequences of the opposing outcome. Yet over time,
it becomes clear that government action can help as much as hurt the new
service providers in developing and solidifying their markets. Four
159. See BREYER, supra note 158, at 20; see also Richard Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 341 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 4 (1971).
160. See Ranchordás, supra note 4, at 30.
161. See id. at 31; Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying
Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 487 (2009).
162. See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral? Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 575, 577 (2007).
163. See, e.g., Letter from Automattic et al. to the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://engine.is/wp-content/uploads/14-28-Feb-18-2015-Engine-Letter.pdf (advocating strong
network neutrality rules on behalf of a large number of internet startups); see also Boorstin, supra
note 153 (describing startup advocacy in favor of stronger net neutrality rules); Smith, supra note
153.
164. See generally Katz, supra note 3 (surveying a variety of legal issues for the sharing
economy); Peppet, supra note 22, at 93–95 (discussing discrimination, privacy, security, and
consent issues for the Internet of Things).
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examples illustrate this pattern: regulatory classification, algorithmic
monopolies, taxation or fees, and platform responsibility.165
A. Regulatory Classification
The first and most prominent issue concerns how to classify new
services that do not easily fit into available legal categories. Not
surprisingly, the initial position of on-demand and other startups is that
they cannot and should not be subject to the old rules and therefore should
be left to regulate themselves. Their predecessors made the same
argument in the 1990s, when cyberlibertarianism was in full swing.
Equally unsurprisingly, a contrary movement urges that regulators bar the
on-demand providers from operating unless they meet the requirements
of existing regulations. Neither option is tenable. Both government actors
and the new entrants must take the initiative to update legal regimes.
Despite the noisy debate, this is beginning to take place.
1. Ignoring the Rules?
Former Uber CEO Travis Kalanick, the most visible embodiment of
the On-Demand Economy, has described himself as a “freedom fighter”
because of his efforts to overcome unnecessary regulations.166 The rapid
growth of on-demand services without affirmative legal authorization,
sometimes in open defiance of existing regulations, has created the
misimpression that regulatory arbitrage is a necessary aspect of ondemand business models.167 In this, they mirror their predecessors of the
dot-com era.
In the early days of cyberlaw, internet-based services focused
primarily on moving digital assets (music, software, etc.) or digitizing the
165. These are by no means the only legal and regulatory issues for the emerging Internet of
the World. Most of the others, though, extend from the basic questions of regulatory classification
or the decision about relative responsibilities of the platforms and their front-line workers. Others
are not unique to the Internet of the World. For example, Internet of Things devices can collect
large amounts of potentially very sensitive personal data, often without users’ awareness. See
Peppet, supra note 22, at 108–11. Uber specifically has been the subject of controversy over
privacy practices, based on its ability to track users’ movements. See Natasha Singer & Mike
Isaac, Uber Data Collection Changes Should Be Barred, Privacy Group Urges, N.Y. TIMES (June
22,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/technology/uber-data-collection-changesshould-be-barred-privacy-group-urges.html?_r=0. These are important questions, but in many
ways, they are extensions of privacy and security debates about online advertising, social
networks, digital mapping, and other services stretching back to the early days of the commercial
internet.
166. Lydia Depillis, Uber Mensch, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/
article/113059/ubers-travis-kalanick-fights-startups-playing-his-own-game.
167. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 3, at 327; Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of
Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 87 (2015).
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process of transacting around physical goods (Amazon, eBay, etc.). In a
number of cases, entrants sought to arbitrage established legal regimes
that governed such activities. YouTube and other video hosting platforms
skirted intellectual property rules. Skype and other voice over internet
protocol (VOIP) services ignored communications regulation.168 PayPal
sought to evade banking regulation.169 Even Google, by storing the full
text of web pages without permission, disregarded copyright protections
to build its search index.170 None of these services would have enjoyed
the same success had they waited for unambiguous approval of their
business models before launching. In fact, YouTube beat out other video
hosting platforms of the time, such as Google, partly based on its
willingness to look the other way (or worse) on infringing material. 171
Many legally questionable services from the dot-com era eventually
succeeded in solidifying their status, either by convincing courts and
regulators they were complying with existing rules or by convincing
legislators and administrative agencies to revise the rules. Of course, this
was not always the case. Napster and several other services pushing the
limits of copyright, in particular, found themselves on the wrong side of
court decisions, leading to their demise.172
Today, Uber’s business model of entering markets without legal
authorization is most directly analogous to P2P startups like Napster and
Skype.173 Of 276 cities in which Uber operated at the end of 2014, just
168. VOIP services were initially in a legal gray area in the United States, but many countries
clearly prohibited them at the time of introduction. See Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past: The
Present and Future of VOIP Regulation, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365, 381 (2006) (“[I]n many
countries laws provided for a monopoly on voice service by a single, often government-owned,
entity, so VoIP service by any other entity was automatically illegal . . . .”).
169. See Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Systems: New Products and Services, New
Law and New Problems, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 52, 53 (2002) (“PayPal’s legal status is
unclear, making legal recourse by consumers problematic. PayPal claims it is a money transmitter,
subject to state money transmitter laws, but several states have disputed that claim. . . . If PayPal
is not a money transmitter, then it likely is an unchartered bank, operating illegally without a
charter.”).
170. Google’s caching and linking practices were eventually challenged under copyright law
and found non-infringing. See, e.g., Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109–10 (D.
Nev. 2006).
171. David Kaplan, YouTube-Viacom, Part Two: YouTube Founders’ Emails Show
Struggles over Copyrighted Works, GIGAOM (Mar. 18, 2010, 4:14 PM), https://gigaom.com/2010/
03/18/419-youtube-viacom-part-two-youtube-founders-e-mails-show-struggles-over-co
(documenting how YouTube’s founders tolerated and sometimes encouraged distribution of
popular infringing content to grow usage of their service).
172. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
173. See Benjamin Edelman, Whither Uber? Competitive Dynamics in Transportation
Networks, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring/Autumn 2015, at 30, 36, https://www.competition
policyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Competition-Volumen-w-cover-11Num-1.pdf (drawing an analogy between Uber’s market entry strategy and Napster).
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seventeen had passed ordinances expressly authorizing its business.174 In
most major cities around the world, only licensed taxis (often subject to
restrictions on entry through a medallion system) or licensed livery (black
car) services can provide for-hire transportation.175 Uber, which views
itself as a software application that matches independent drivers and
riders, fits neither category well.176 So in most cases, it has simply begun
operating and then pushed local regulators to recognize it.177 Other ondemand services such as Airbnb have also set up shop and expanded
rapidly without regulatory authorization.178
The argument in favor of this approach is that local governments move
too slowly and are beholden to incumbent providers, so innovators must
take matters in their own hands if they hope to succeed.179 In a typical
example, prominent venture capitalist and essayist Paul Graham tweeted
in 2012 that “Uber is so obviously a good thing that you can measure how
corrupt cities are by how hard they try to suppress it.”180 Uber provides a
convenient service to many users frustrated with taxis, so it has a readymade army of supporters to point to and leverage in its battles against
174. See Eva Grantsimran Khosla, Here’s Everywhere Uber Is Banned Around the World,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-everywhere-uberis-banned-around-the-world-2015-4; MacMillan, supra note 51.
175. Jenny Che, 9 Countries That Aren’t Giving Uber an Inch, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12,
2015, 12:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uber-countries-governments-taxidrivers_us_55bfa3a9e4b0d4f33a037a4b (listing numerous cities across the world that have
banned transportation services like Uber).
176. In New York City, for example, Uber is in conflict with the city over issues such as
access for riders with disabilities, contributions to traffic congestion, and collection of taxes to
support mass transit. See Matt Flegenheimer & Emma Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in
Struggle over New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/17/nyregion/city-hall-and-uber-clash-in-struggle-over-new-york-streets.html.
177. See Schumpeter, Shredding the Rules, ECONOMIST (May 2, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650142-striking-number-innovative-companieshave-business-models-flout-law-shredding; Karen Weise, This is How Uber Takes over a City,
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (June 23, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city. Uber has taken the same position
with regard to specific local obligations, such as the requirement to serve customers with
disabilities. See Strochlic, supra note 55.
178. See Dana Palombo, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate ShortTerm Residential Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 289–90 (2015); Press
Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Releases Report Documenting
Widespread Illegality Across Airbnb’s NYC Listings; Site Dominated by Commercial Users
(Oct.
16,
2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-releases-reportdocumenting-widespread-illegality-across-airbnbs-nyc (claiming that 72% of Airbnb listings in
New York were illegal).
179. See Sundararajan, supra note 59.
180. Paul Graham (@paulg), TWITTER (July 9, 2012, 3:49 PM), https://twitter.com/
paulg/status/222462460978937856.
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local regulators.181 The counterargument is well stated by Barry
Korengold, president of the San Francisco Cab Drivers Association, in an
article about Uber in Vanity Fair: “I think of them as robber barons. They
started off by operating illegally, without following any of the regulations
and unfairly competing. And that’s how they became big—they had
enough money to ignore all the rules.”182
One seeming contrast to the parallel dot-com era startups is that many
of the rules governing on-demand service providers are local.183 A
decision to authorize Uber in New York or Chicago has no effect on its
legitimacy in Portland or Philadelphia. However, this discontinuity
parallels the long-identified conflict between territorial laws made by
sovereign governments and online systems that are ignorant of political
borders.184 Many real-space markets are local because of physical limits
on service delivery, communities, or information flow. Cyberspace,
being inherently dimensionless, tends toward offerings that are national
or even global.185 The current generation of on-demand services further
eliminates the boundaries between the physical and digital worlds.186
The need to engage with local regulators adds additional complexity
to the resolution of legal issues for on-demand services, but the basic
controversies cover similar ground. Economics and customer needs for
local services often vary little between cities, even when a different
regulator is empowered in each one. Therefore, the ultimate equilibrium
for services such as Uber is likely to involve similar treatment in all major
181. Fitz Tepper, Uber Launches “De Blasio’s Uber” Feature in NYC with 25-Minute Wait
Times, TECHCRUNCH (July 16, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/ 2015/07/16/uber-launches-deblasios-uber-feature-in-nyc-with-25-minute-wait-times/; see Weise, supra note 177.
182. Kara Swisher, Man and Uber Man, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/12/uber-travis-kalanick-controversy.
183. See GORMAN GILBERT & ROBERT E. SAMUELS, THE TAXICAB: AN URBAN
TRANSPORTATION SURVIVOR 142–43 (1982); Hannah A. Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing
Economy: Should Regulators Impose Uber Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 410
(2015) (“While the federal government was largely responsible for taxi regulations during and
after World War II, by the 1970s, regulating the taxi industry was largely left to municipalities.”).
The exact structure varies. In Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission regulates
taxi services everywhere but Philadelphia, where the Philadelphia Parking Authority regulates
them. See Justine Coyne, PUC Grants Emergency Approval for Lyft, Uber, PITT. BUS. TIMES (July
24, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2014/07/24/puc-grantsemergency-approval-for-lyft-uber.html; Philadelphia Taxis & Limos, PA. PUB. UTIL.
C OMMISSION , http://www.puc.state.pa.us/consumer_info/transportation/motor_carrier/
philadelphia_taxis_limos.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
184. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1367–70; Post, supra note 75, at 170–71.
185. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1370.
186. One consequence of this merger is that digitally-enabled services in one location can
have significant spillover effects elsewhere. Such spillovers have been analyzed in the
environmental law context but not extensively for online activity. See Sarah Light, Precautionary
Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 353 (2017).
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cities. The existing local regulation just makes the process of resolving
the issues longer.
Backed by billions of dollars in funding, Uber has waged an
aggressive campaign against localities refusing to authorize its
business.187 Local authorities in cities such as Philadelphia have
responded by fining or even impounding cars of Uber drivers.188 In
Brisbane, Australia, Uber reportedly blocked the accounts of transport
inspectors to prevent them from imposing fines for its unlicensed
operation.189 It has won some significant victories, including in New
York City, where the mayor sought to cap the number of Uber vehicles
and impose other conditions.190 Yet in some locales, such as Germany,
Uber has been forced to retreat under pressure from regulators.191
2. Finding Shared Interests
In predicting the path forward for Uber and other unauthorized ondemand services, the useful comparison is between the failure of Napster
and Grokster, on the one hand, and the success of Skype’s VOIP service,
on the other. The P2P file-sharing services claimed that technology put
them outside the reach of traditional legal rules, but the Supreme Court
rejected their arguments.192 While these companies gained support from
copyright reform advocates and other forces, they could not call upon
significant government actors to advocate for their cause.
Skype, by contrast, took advantage of the FCC’s unwillingness to
classify VOIP as a telecommunications service, based on its desire to
187. See Weise, supra note 177. Airbnb has been similarly aggressive, mobilizing its users
as a political force and spending millions to defeat a proposed San Francisco ordinance that would
have greatly restricted its operations. See Conor Dougherty & Mike Isaac, Airbnb and Uber
Mobilize Vast User Base to Sway Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/technology/airbnb-and-uber-mobilize-vast-user-base-tosway-policy.html?_r=0; Carolyn Said, Uber, Lyft, Airbnb Harness Users to Lobby Lawmakers for
Them, SFGATE (Jan. 11, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/ business/article/Uber-LyftAirbnb-harness-users-to-lobby-6005562.php.
188. See Victor Fiorillo, PPA Impounds UberX Vehicles in Undercover Sting Operation,
PHILA. MAG. (Oct. 26, 2014, 1:17 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/ 2014/10/26/uberphiladelphia-uberx-ppa-sting-impounds/.
189. Steve Dent, Transport Inspectors Say Uber Blocked Their Accounts to Avoid Fines,
ENGADGET (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/01/15/uber-dodges-fines-australia/.
190. Josh Dawsey & Andrew Tangel, Uber Won’t Face Limits on Surge Pricing Under NYC
Council Legislation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2016, 6:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uberwont-face-limits-on-surge-pricing-under-nyc-council-legislation-1452880443.
191. See Mark Scott, Uber’s No-Holds-Barred Expansion Strategy Fizzles in Germany, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/technology/ubers-no-holds-barredexpansion-strategy-fizzles-in-germany.html?_r=0.
192. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919, 923–24, 940–
41 (2005).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 5

924

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

shield new entrants from regulation and to push down on inflated
international settlement rates.193 Government action enabled Skype to
reach critical mass and legitimize its business model.194 During the term
of Chairman Michael Powell, who led the agency between 2001 and
2005, the FCC was particularly eager to promote “nascent services” free
from regulation.195 The FCC’s 2004 order declaring the FreeWorld
Dialup service outside of traditional communications regulation, while
not directly applicable to Skype, made clear the agency’s view that
innovative services offering new options to consumers should be
encouraged, rather than banned.196 Other agencies took a similar
approach to nascent digital services at the time. For example, the FDIC’s
2002 decision that the government should not regulate PayPal as a bank
gave PayPal leverage against state regulators seeking to impose
significant limitations on its digital payments business.197
Eventually, the solution for Uber, Lyft, and other unauthorized ondemand services will be government action to create new rules that
address the necessary public policy considerations, rather than fighting
over whether the old rules apply.198 Such steps would not only resolve
legitimate public policy concerns, but also legitimize the on-demand
services and thereby remove obstacles to their further growth and
innovation. As Airbnb spokesman Christopher Nulty stated in response
to calls for an ordinance governing short-term rentals in Boston, “We

193. See Chérie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are Regulators
Poised to Address the Status of IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19, 19, 24 (2003);
Jonathan Lee, Microsoft-Skype: The End of the “Free Lunch?” (May 19, 2011, 3:41 AM),
http://www.telecomsense.com/2011/05/microsoft-skype-the-end-of-the.php.
194. Lee, supra note 193.
195. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Federal
Communications
Bar
Association,
New
York
Chapter (July
11,
2002),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/2002/spkqa217.html.
196. Petition for Declaratory Ruling That Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is Neither
Telecomms. Nor a Telecomms. Serv., 19 FCC Rcd. 3307, 3317–20 (2004). For more details on
the FCC’s approach to VOIP, see Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 564–
65 (2010) [hereinafter Werbach, Off the Hook]; Kevin Werbach, No Dialtone: The End of the
Public Switched Telephone Network, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 203, 231 (2014) [hereinafter Werbach,
No Dialtone].
197. See Feds: PayPal Not a Bank, CNET (May 19, 2002, 1:09 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/feds-paypal-not-a-bank/.
198. Uber and Lyft have already switched toward advocating legislation at the state level,
especially when it includes preemption of inconsistent or troublesome local regulation. See Light,
supra note 186.
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want cities to regulate Airbnb and make it easier for regular people to
share their home, pay their bills and contribute to their community.”199
The key for Skype and PayPal was that regulators were convinced
these new entrants actually promoted public policy goals, and that
necessary obligations could be enforced without legacy regulatory
classifications. In the case of VOIP, the FCC adopted limited
requirements, such as connection to 911 emergency service, on a
piecemeal basis, carefully restricting the application to a narrow class of
services.200 Major on-demand platforms have begun to advocate for a
similar approach, distinguishing sweeping regulatory classification or
restrictions they oppose from targeted initiative to address recognized
problems. For example, Airbnb in November 2015 issued a “Community
Compact” detailing affirmative steps it would take to work with
regulators on acknowledged issues.201
The process has gone farthest in the ride-hailing market. At least
thirty-nine states have adopted laws defining and regulating
“transportation network companies” (TNCs), with legislation under
consideration in several others.202 These laws provide an opportunity to
ensure that the public policy goals of traditional regulations are achieved,
even when the business model changes. They recognize that a choice
between ill-fitting legacy rules and no rules at all will not produce a good
outcome. And they show that the political process can operate
affirmatively to address conflicts created by new digital businesses. For
example, the Illinois law mandates:
•Insurance coverage;
•Driver background checks and licensing requirements;
•Zero tolerance for drugs and alcohol while driving;

199. Matt Rocheleau, Lawmakers Worry Owners Taking Advantage of Airbnb, BOS. GLOBE
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/08/23/some-boston-housing-nowused-like-hotels-via-airbnb/deDVVOZf6EYYBmxDyWWHfJ/story.html.
200. See Werbach, No Dialtone, supra note 196, at 232–33.
201. See Mike Isaac, Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnb-pledges-towork-with-cities-and-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html.
202. See Illinois Transportation Network Providers Act, 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57 (2016);
Transportation Network Companies, PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N AM.,
http://www.pciaa.net/industry-issues/transportation-network-companies (last visited Mar. 16,
2017); see also Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While
Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry, Rulemaking 12-12-011 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n July 30, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K112/
77112285.PDF.
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•Transparency about fare calculation and receipts;
•Disclose of fare increases during surge pricing; and
•Non-discrimination for passengers.203
The key to these solutions, like the FCC’s response to VOIP, is that
they involve government action, but not a reflexive insistence on existing
rules. While on-demand companies may initially reject any talk of
regulation, they have had to adopt many of the same kinds of measures
(such as driver background checks for the ride-hailing providers and
insurance for lodging providers) that regulators might require. An
authorized regulatory framework could increase consumer confidence in
on-demand services, allowing them to reach an even larger segment of
the population. Uber and Airbnb’s willingness to advocate in favor of
state legislation or municipal rules regulating their businesses, when they
provide sufficient flexibility, suggest that movement in this direction is
already occurring.
B. Algorithmic Monopolies
On-demand services create new competition for entrenched
incumbents, often in markets subject to significant entry barriers under
the existing configuration. On the other hand, they can themselves
achieve a greater level of market power than the companies they displace.
As already noted, the combination of software-based businesses and
ubiquitous mobile devices mean that on-demand services can grow at
hyperbolic rates.204 Network effects mean that successful platforms in
network markets often tend toward dominant positions.205 Even the most
mature on-demand markets are still young and fast-changing, so antitrust
authorities have been hesitant to intervene, but over time, competition
law concerns are likely to become a major concern in many of these areas.
As a matter of timing, regulatory classification and basic issues of
licensing and business authorization will come to a head sooner because
they consider whether the new services can operate at all. As new
legislation and collaboration with regulators resolve these issues, antitrust
issues will become more prominent.
Uber, because of its hyperbolic growth and dominance of the ridehailing markets, has already been subject to attacks as a monopolist, after

203. See Illinois Transportation Network Providers Act, 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57.
204. See supra text accompanying note 34.
205. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 509, 523, 532, 592 (1998).
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just six years in business.206 In the United States, Uber’s one major
competitor is Lyft, and it is many times smaller.207 Sidecar, the third
player in the United States, shut down and sold off its assets in early
2016.208
Under U.S. antitrust law, having a large market share alone, even one
considered a monopoly, is not itself grounds for action; the company must
engage in some anti-competitive action to create or maintain the
monopoly.209 There have been several accusations of abusive practices
by Uber, including allegations that Uber local managers deliberately
booked and then canceled thousands of fake trips on Lyft, occupying Lyft
drivers so that Uber could gain a competitive advantage.210 As Uber
moves into other markets (such as delivery of goods) using its fleet of
drivers,211 it will be subject to concerns about illegally tying to leverage
its existing dominance. Uber has also continuously reduced prices in
many markets in competition against Lyft, to the point where, despite
Uber’s incredible growth, it lost $1.7 billion on $1.2 billion in revenue
through the first three quarters of 2015, according to leaked documents.212
This behavior opens Uber up to charges of predatory pricing. None of
206. See Felix Barber, How Do We Fight 21st Century Monopolies Like Amazon, Google
and Uber?, BUS. JOURNALS (Dec. 11, 2014, 9:35 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
bizjournals/news/2014/12/11/fight-21st-century-monopolies-like-amazon-uber.html;
Susan
Crawford, Getting over Uber, BACKCHANNEL (Oct. 16, 2015), https://backchannel.com/gettingover-uber-fdf75faf7f6e; Gregory Ferenstein, The Next Internet Monopoly: Uber, the
Transportation Network, VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://venturebeat.com/
2014/08/20/the-next-internet-monopoly-uber-the-transportation-network/.
207. See David Gelles & Mike Isaac, Challenging Uber, Lyft Bets on a Road Wide Enough
for Two, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/technology/
challenging-uber-lyft-bets-on-a-road-wide-enough-for-two.html?_r=0. Uber does face significant
competition from home-grown entrants in some other major countries, notably China and India,
and several major players announced a global “anti-Uber” alliance in December 2015. See Aza
Wee Sile, Uber Rivals Form Alliance Covering Half of World’s Population, CNBC (Dec. 3, 2015,
7:53 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/03/uber-rivals-didi-kuaidi-grabtaxi-lyft-ola-formalliance-covering-half-of-worlds-population.html. However, because ride-hailing markets are
local, Uber’s limited market share in China does not rebut concerns about its power in the U.S.
market. See id.
208. See Gelles & Isaac, supra note 207.
209. Eric K. Clemons & Nehal Madhani, Regulation of Digital Businesses with Natural
Monopolies or Third-Party Payment Business Models: Antitrust Lessons Form the Analysis of
Google, 27 J. MGMT. INFO. SCI. 43, 72 (2011).
210. See Fink, supra note 56.
211. See Douglas Macmillan, The $50 Billion Question: Can Uber Deliver?, WALL ST. J.
(June 15, 2015, 10:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-50-billion-question-can-uberdeliver-1434422042.
212. See Eric Newcomer & Ellen Huet, Facing a Price War, Uber Bets on Volume,
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-01-21/facing-a-price-war-uber-bets-on-volume.
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these concerns has yet given rise to federal antitrust action against Uber,
but the potential is clear.
The contrary argument is that on-demand markets have little in the
way of entry barriers from a technical standpoint. Because so many of the
foundational aspects of these businesses are in shared infrastructure such
as wireless connectivity, distributed among users in the case of mobile
phones, or available as a service at affordable rates through platforms
such as Amazon’s cloud, startup capital requirements are far lower than
for the equivalent legacy businesses. Often, significant licensing and
regulatory requirements operate as entry barriers, but those are the ones
the new providers disregard.213 As a result, there is reason to believe
market discipline will self-correct for anti-competitive practices. This
leads some commenters to suggest there are not significant antitrust
concerns in the on-demand world.214
This perspective, however, fails to take into account the novel
competition concerns that arise in an environment where physical assets
and even people can be treated as information and manipulated through
software driven by big data analytics.215 The Microsoft antitrust case is
instructive here.216 The action against Microsoft involved novel questions
about competition in network markets, the business dynamics of
software, and the potential of courts and regulators to oversee technology
choices.217 The court had to decide whether Microsoft was illegally tying
a browser (a piece of software) into an operating system (also a piece of
software), and a number of other technical issues.218 From the perspective
of Netscape and the technology companies that pressed for government
action, the issue was not regulation of software; it was the chilling of
opportunities for competition and innovation.219
For today’s on-demand and IoT services, market share in the
conventional sense is not the only dimension to consider. These platforms
are based on software algorithms driven by significant volumes of real-

213. See supra Section III.A.
214. See Edelman and Geradin, supra note 3, at 10 (“To date, the growth of software
platforms seems to trigger few competition law concerns, and even where certain software
platforms have come to dominate their respective sectors, we see little sign of market structure
that would prevent entry . . . .”).
215. See supra text accompanying note 18.
216. See supra Subsection II.C.1.
217. See generally Lemley & McGowan, supra note 205, at 496 (explaining how network
economic effects could raise significant issues for antitrust); Economides, supra note 119
(discussing the significance of network economics to an understanding of the issues in the
Microsoft case).
218. Economides, supra note 119, at 26–28.
219. Id. at 27–29.
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time data.220 The data itself potentially becomes the foundation for what
have been called “algorithmic monopolies.”221 The more data a service
has, the better the quality of its decisions. 222 Even when there are no entry
barriers in the conventional sense, a dominant player with control over
data may have an insurmountable edge over potential competitors.223
In the case of Uber, predictive software algorithms decide where to
direct drivers to minimize wait times for riders, even before the demand
manifests. And Uber’s surge pricing mechanism increases fares
(sometimes by a factor of five or more) at times of heavy demand.224
When criticized for charging more at times when riders needed the
service most (such as during storms), Uber CEO Travis Kalanick stated,
“We are not setting the price. The market is setting the price . . . . We
have algorithms to determine what that market is.”225 Kalanick’s point
was that the market-clearing price reflected supply and demand, and
surge pricing incentivized more drivers to take to the roads. His phrasing,
however, was telling. The market “is” whatever Uber’s algorithms say it
is. The software controls not only the price, but the timing and boundaries
of surge pricing, as well as what information is provided to drivers when.
Uber can choose what factors to use in “determining” the market,
including rewarding or disincentivizing certain classes of drivers, or even
elbowing out competitors.226 The details and operation of the algorithms

220. See Matthew Stoller, Uber’s Algorithmic Monopoly, OBSERVATIONS ON CREDIT &
SURVEILLANCE (Apr. 9, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://mattstoller.tumblr.com/post/82233202309/ubersalgorithmic-monopoly-we-are-not-setting.
221. See id.
222. A similar argument can be made about Google, which is able to provide the best search
results because it has by far the largest share of queries. See Eric K. Clemons & Nehal Madhani,
Regulation of Digital Businesses with Natural Monopolies or Third-Party Payment Business
Models: Antitrust Lessons from the Analysis of Google, 27 J. MGMT. INFO. SCI. 43, 52, 54, 66
(2010). However, the search market is substantially different from on-demand services in that it
is entirely digital, services are offered for free and monetized through advertising, and a search
engine’s primary function is to direct users elsewhere.
223. See ALLEN P. GRUNES & MAURICE E. STUCKE, NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT: THE IMPORTANT
ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA 1–3 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr15_grunes_4_22f.authcheckdam.pdf. But see
ANJA LAMBRECHT & CATHERINE E. TUCKER, CAN BIG DATA PROTECT A FIRM FROM COMPETITION?
(2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CPILambrecht-Tucker.pdf (arguing that possession of big data alone does not provide a sustainable
competitive advantage).
224. See Pricing the Surge: The Microeconomics of Uber’s Attempt to Revolutionise Taxi
Markets, ECONOMIST (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/
21599766-microeconomics-ubers-attempt-revolutionise-taxi-markets-pricing-surge.
225. Marcus Wohlsen, Uber Boss Says Surging Prices Rescue People from the Snow, WIRED
(Dec. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/12/uber-surge-pricing/.
226. See Stoller, supra note 220.
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are secret, so it is impossible to know from observation whether Uber is
using them in anti-competitive or discriminatory ways.227
Another concern involves the potential that such decision making
algorithms can cooperate with one another to engage in price fixing. Such
“algorithmic cartels” may develop even without explicit instructions
from the service providers because they represent an efficient solution to
maximize each firm’s profits.228 Concerns about these scenarios are
already developing around electronic commerce sites such as Amazon,
where rival “bots” do battle to price merchandise on user-managed virtual
storefronts.229 In an on-demand world, more and more resources that were
previously subject to fixed prices or delivered by traditional service
providers will be available through dynamically created algorithmic
marketplaces. Just as the Microsoft antitrust trial forced an examination
of the growing importance of personal computer software to existing and
developing industries, on-demand services will bring algorithmic
competition policy questions to the fore.
Finally, as the Internet of the World advances, on-demand services
will become more foundational for commerce and communities. At some
point, there should be consideration of whether some of them reach the
level of importance coupled with potential for abuse that has in other
industries given rise to utility regulation.230 Certain competitive tactics
that are otherwise legitimate are off the table for firms that enjoy the
benefits of controlling essential services.
As with the Microsoft trial, it will likely be current and potential
competitors to the dominant on-demand providers who push for a fuller
examination of the novel antitrust concerns. The dominant players may
find that pulling back the curtain somewhat and providing access to
information about algorithms or commitments against certain behaviors
is preferable to risking an antitrust showdown. The FTC has formed a
new Office of Technology Research and Investigation, which among

227. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 4–16 (2015).
228. See Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of
Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (2016); Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Artificial
Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition 7 (Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law,
Research Paper No. 267, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2591874;
Jill Priluck, When Bots Collude, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
business/currency/when-bots-collude.
229. See Mehra, supra note 228, at 1335–36.
230. See Kevin Werbach, Is Uber a Common Carrier?, 12 I/S 135, 147–53 (2016) (arguing
for application of the core principles of common carriage to new services that functionally operate
as utilities).
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other things has a mandate to examine algorithmic transparency.231
C. Taxation and Fees
As described above, concerns about collection of sales taxes on ecommerce and imposition of discriminatory taxes on online activity were
significant in the early days of the commercial internet.232 Thanks to the
ITFA and negotiated resolution, potential problems were overcome, or at
least delayed to the point where they could be addressed through
compromise.233
The growth of the On-Demand Economy raises two kinds of tax
issues. The first involves collection of personal taxes from workers
providing on-demand services, such as Uber and Lyft drivers.234 Though
complicated by legal uncertainty about the status of these workers as
employees or independent contractors, reference to existing rules can
generally resolve such tax issues.235 The biggest issues are difficulties of
awareness, reporting, and enforcement for large numbers of individuals
in unfamiliar roles.236 In contrast, questions about the responsibility of
the on-demand providers themselves to remit taxes and fees leads to
thornier issues. These payments are a direct cost, so these companies are
obviously eager to avoid being subject to them. Yet their failure to pay
raises issues of equity with pre-existing providers, and, as with the sales
taxation issues for e-commerce, drains funding from local and state
governments.
1. We’re Not Tax Collectors . . . or Are We?
The On-Demand Economy company most directly confronting
taxation is Airbnb, which allows people to offer short-term rentals of
apartments, houses, or rooms. Founded in 2008, Airbnb has grown almost
as rapidly as Uber.237 In 2014, it averaged over one million guests per

231. Katherine Noyes, The FTC Is Worried About Algorithmic Transparency, and You
Should Be Too, PCWORLD (Apr. 9, 2015, 8:36 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2908372/
the-ftc-is-worried-about-algorithmic-transparency-and-you-should-be-too.html.
232. See supra Subsection II.C.2.
233. See supra Subsection II.C.2.
234. See Oei & Ring, supra note 52, at 1009; Kathleen Pender, If You Make Money in the
Sharing
Economy, the
IRS
Will
Know, SFGATE (Feb. 22, 2014, 2:43 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/ article/If-you-make-money-in-the-sharing-economythe-IRS-5258941.php.
235. See Oei & Ring, supra note 52, at 1019–23.
236. See id. at 1052–54.
237. See Nassim Khadem, Are Airbnb and Uber Creating a New Black Economy?, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Feb. 14, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/business/are-airbnb-anduber-creating-a-new-black-economy-20150212-13dg7p.
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month, and it now operates in over 30,000 cites worldwide.238 In general,
Airbnb has taken a more conciliatory line toward governments than
Uber.239 With regard to taxes, however, it has tussled with cities over the
proper solution.240
Most major American cities impose a tax, in some cases a substantial
one (14.5% in San Francisco, for example) on hotel rooms.241 The hotel
operator collects these taxes.242 This contrasts with the Uber situation,
where there is an option to tax individual workers as independent
contractors if income taxes are not collected by Uber itself as an
employer. Because Airbnb styles itself as a passive intermediary, it
originally declined to add these local taxes to the rates that its hosts
charged to their guests.243 From cities’ viewpoints, however, this was a
clear evasion of taxes by a direct competitor to traditional hotels.244
Nationwide, Airbnb was estimated to owe as much as $200 million.245
The analogous issue for Uber involves fees imposed on for-hire
transportation services to contribute to other government programs. In
New York City, taxis must collect a fifty-cent fee on every fare, which
the city uses to fund mass transit.246 Uber refuses to do so, although it
charges all riders a one-dollar “Safe Rides Fee” in connection with its
own costs for background checks and other safety-oriented activities.247
The transit fee does not directly affect taxi or Uber rides, but it contributes
238. Id. Analysts estimate Airbnb could surpass the world’s largest hotel chains in bookings
within a few years. See Michael B. Baker, Barclays: Airbnb Usage to Surpass Hotel Cos., but Not
for Business Travel, BUS. TRAVEL NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.businesstravelnews.com/
Hotel-News/Barclays-Airbnb-Usage-To-Surpass-Hotel-Cos-But-Not-For-Business-Travel.
239. See Khadem, supra note 237.
240. See Joyce E. Cutler, Cities Grappling with Challenges of How to Tax, Regulate ShortTerm Rentals, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.bna.com/cities-grapplingchallenges-n17179897258/; Brad Tuttle, The Other Complication for Airbnb and the Sharing
Economy: Taxes, TIME (June 15, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/06/15/the-othercomplication-for-airbnb-and-the-sharing-economy-taxes.
241. See Cutler, supra note 240.
242. See James Mak, Taxing Hotel Room Rentals in the U.S., 27 J. TRAVEL RES. 10, 10
(1988).
243. See Tuttle, supra note 240 (observing Airbnb’s policy for reporting income, in that “the
rules are unclear, [and] enforcement is almost nonexistent”).
244. Id.
245. Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of “Tens of Millions” to S.F.,
SFGATE (Feb. 18, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/M-RAirbnb-pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-6087802.php.
246. See Bill de Blasio, A Fair Ride for New Yorkers: How the City Should Respond to the
Rapid Rise of Uber, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 18, 2015, 11:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/bill-de-blasio-fair-ride-new-yorkers-article-1.2296041.
247. Biz Carson, Here’s How Much Uber Charges for “Safe Ride” in Different US Cities,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-cities-with-highestuber-safe-rides-fees-2015-10.
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to the overall quality of transit in the city, particularly the level of traffic
congestion.248
While there are arguments against charging taxi riders to help pay for
subway expenses, they apply as much to taxis as Uber. The only reason
Uber currently does not pay is that in New York City, it is classified as a
livery car service, not a taxi provider, and the fee was only imposed on
taxis.249 If Uber contributed, it would generate an estimated $70 million
per year for mass transit in New York.250
2. The Taxman Cometh
The debates over taxation and fees for on-demand services began as
classic conflicts between governments seeking to impose obligations and
new companies seeking to avoid them. Yet fairly quickly, there has been
a significant shift. In particular, Airbnb has changed its tune. In February
2015, it paid an estimated $25 million in back taxes to the city of San
Francisco.251 It is negotiating with several cities about arrangements that
would require it to collect hotel taxes from its hosts.252 The company
wants these arrangements because they come with explicit authorization
for Airbnb short-term rentals, which violate regulations in many
jurisdictions.253 The company just serves as a pass-through for the taxes,
which it takes out of hosts’ share of revenues.254 So there is no direct
financial cost for Airbnb to comply.255
Despite the company’s newfound support for tax collection, Airbnb
has not entirely given up its cyberlibertarian instincts. After the company
248. See de Blasio, supra note 246 (stating that “[m]ore than 2,000 new for-hire vehicles are
being added to [the] streets [of New York] every month”).
249. See Jose Martinez, Proposal to Add 50-Cent Surcharge onto Car Service Rides to Fund
MTA Gaines Steam, NY1 (June 17, 2015, 10:15 PM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/
news/2015/06/17/proposal-to-add-50-cent-surcharge-onto-car-service-rides-to-fund-mta-gainssteam.html.
250. See id.
251. See Matier & Ross, supra note 245.
252. Id.
253. See Ann Carrns, Lodging Taxes and Airbnb Hosts: Who Pays, and How, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/your-money/lodging-taxes-and-airbnbhosts-who-pays-and-how.html?_r=0; Alison Griswold, Why Airbnb Desperately Wants to Pay
Hotel Taxes, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
moneybox/2015/02/airbnb_hotel_taxes_why_does_the_sharing_economy_startup_want_to_pay
_them.html.
254. Carrns, supra note 253.
255. Reducing hosts’ revenues may lead fewer hosts to participate (thus reducing Airbnb’s
revenues) or cause hosts to raise rates to compensate (thus potentially suppressing demand). Either
way, there could be some negative financial consequences from Airbnb’s decision. Now that the
company is well-established and dominant in its market, however, the displacement effects for
both hosts and guests are likely to be limited.
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began remitting hotel taxes in San Francisco, it ran an advertising
campaign on light rail stations around the city.256 The ads, which included
lines such as “Dear Public Library System, We hope you use some of the
$12 million in hotel taxes to keep the library open later,” provoked
significant controversy.257 Airbnb seemed to be congratulating itself for
complying with the law and treating government agencies with sarcasm.
The company quickly apologized and promised to take them down.258
Nonetheless, the incident suggests Airbnb has not yet fully
accommodated itself to engaging with government. Based on the pattern
in other contexts, it is just a matter of time.
Uber is also moving toward acceptance of certain taxes or fees. Under
a temporary deal with New York City, it has agreed to explore ways to
contribute to mass transit.259 The company argues that it indirectly makes
significant contributions to mass transit services through the sales taxes
it collects, but those are not dedicated to any specific use. 260 The issue
has not yet been resolved, but the willingness of both sides to discuss a
solution suggests that progress is being made.
Ultimately, the differential treatment involves the city’s decision to
impose the fee on taxis but not car services. If the city imposed on all forhire transportation providers, the argument for excluding Uber and Lyft
would be weak. At that point, the debate could properly focus on whether
such a fee is a good means of funding mass transit, not the technology
used to provide the for-hire services. Perhaps the city should use other
funding sources or should exempt carpooling services, such as Uber’s
UberPool or Lyft’s Lyft Line, that share cars among multiple riders.261
Ride-hailing services are likely to be the catalyst for re-examining
many such transportation-oriented funding mechanisms at the local level.
The equilibrium points will inevitably be somewhere between the status
quo in which Uber and Lyft are non-compliant and the elimination of all
256. Julia Carrie Wong, Airbnb Apologizes for Passive Aggressive Ads on Muni Shelters, SF
WEEKLY (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:22 PM), http://archives.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2015/10/21/passiveaggressive-pro-airbnb-ads-appear-on-muni-shleters.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. Associated Press, Uber Strikes Surprise Last-Minute Deal with New York City,
CHRONICLE (July 23, 2015, 4:09 AM), http://www.chroniclet.com/national-news/2015/07/
23/Uber-strikes-surprise-last-minute-deal-with-New-York-City.html.
260. Dan Rivoli, Uber Pushes Against Mayor de Blasio That It Doesn’t Pay Enough in
Taxes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/uber-claims-pays-fair-share-nyc-taxes-article-1.2335169.
261. Andrew J. Hawkins, Even Cynical New Yorkers Don’t Mind Sharing Uber Rides with
Strangers, VERGE (Nov. 9, 2015, 4:17 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/9/9698658/uberuberpool-nyc-october-ride-share-numbers; Meet Lyft Line, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/line (last
visited Mar. 16, 2017).
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such revenue sources from the ride-hailing industry. The example of sales
taxes for e-commerce shows that complications can eventually be
resolved in a manner that does not overly disadvantage innovative new
market entrants. The process may not be easy, and some government
actors will certainly continue to press for discriminatory or onerous taxes,
but there is no realistic alternative. As with the legal classification of ondemand services, acceptance of the government role will speed the
resolution process.
D. Platform Responsibility
On December 5, 2014, a young woman stepped into a hired car in New
Delhi, India.262 Instead of taking his passenger to her destination, the
driver, Shiv Kumar Yadav, drove to a secluded location and raped her.263
Eight weeks later, the woman filed a lawsuit over her assault. There were
two unusual features of the suit. The defendant was not Yadav.264 And
the forum for the litigation was not India; it was the Northern District of
California.265 The target was Uber, for which Yadav worked at the time
of the attack.266
The New Delhi case generated significant notoriety, but it was not
unique. In numerous other incidents passengers have accused drivers for
Uber and similar on-demand transportation services of misconduct.267
These involve sexual assaults,268 physical attacks,269 and injuries due to

262. See Dominic Rushe, Delhi Woman Sues Uber for “Negligence and Fraud” After
Alleged Rape, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
jan/29/delhi-woman-sues-uber-rape-negligence.
263. Id.
264. Uber classified him, like all Uber drivers, as an independent contractor. Id.
265. Id.
266. The plaintiff voluntarily terminated the lawsuit prior to trial several months later,
apparently after settling with Uber. See Dan Levine, Indian Woman Who Sued Uber over Rape
Accusation Ends Lawsuit, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usuber-tech-rape-settlement-idUSKCN0R14GV20150901.
267. See, e.g., Mark Macmurdo, Hold the Phone! “Peer-to-Peer” Ridesharing Services,
Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV. 307, 337–38 (2015) (citing Teixeira v. Car Cab Three,
Inc., 1994 Mass. App. Div. 154 (Dist. Ct. 1994)) (arguing that Uber and Lyft should be held liable
for the acts of drivers regardless of how the drivers are classified).
268. See, e.g., Sharon Chen, Ride Share Driver Accused of Sexually Assaulting Teen Girls,
FOX 5, (Sept. 21, 2016, 9:27 AM), http://fox5sandiego.com/2016/09/21/rideshare-driver-arrestedfor-assaulting-multiple-customers/; Marisa Kendall, Uber Sued over Alleged Rapes by Drivers,
CONSUMER FED’N CAL. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://consumercal.org/uber-sued-over-alleged-rapes-bydrivers/.
269. See, e.g., Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye from Driver’s Hammer Attack.
(Sept.
30,
2014,
9:37
PM),
Could
Uber
Be
Held
Liable?,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/ 2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack-liability.
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crashes allegedly involving reckless driving.270 Airbnb had its own
scandal in 2011, when a guest robbed one of Airbnb’s hosts, and the
company tried to prevent the host from reporting about it.271 Sporadic
reports of similar incidents continue.272
In these situations, the question is what is needed to ensure against
harmful conduct by individuals on the platform. This directly parallels a
key issue dating from the early days of cyberlaw: intermediary liability.
By their nature, on-demand services use networked software platforms
and mobile devices to connect otherwise unaffiliated service providers
and customers. They take individuals who otherwise might not even be
offering commercial services and incorporate them into what feels to
users like a huge, well-oiled business operation. In this way, they are
similar to first-generation e-commerce sites such as eBay, which enables
individual sellers to reach huge markets. When something goes wrong,
does it make more sense to treat the sellers as atomic units or as cogs in
a larger machine, operated by the platform intermediary?
1. Intermediary as Software Provider
Uber and Lyft declare in their terms of service that they are just
software providers and thus not responsible for the conduct of drivers
who happen to use their software to find riders.273 In Uber’s telling, it
serves as a directory matching drivers with customers: essentially, a
souped-up phone book.274 This claim is eerily similar to the arguments
from P2P services such as Napster and Grokster in the 1990s that they
were merely directories connecting users interested in sharing files.275
270. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Fatal Collision Makes Car-Sharing Worries No Longer
Theoretical, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/yourmoney/relayrides-accident-raises-questions-on-liabilities-of-car-sharing.html.
271. See Hayley Tsukayama, Airbnb Burglary Victim Says Company Tried to Quiet Her,
WASH. POST (July 29, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/faster-forward/post/airbnbrobbery-victim-says-company-tried-to-quiether/2011/07/29/gIQA7R03gI_blog.html.
272. See, e.g., Reuven Blau, Unexpected Sex Party Destroys Pricy Chelsea Apartment, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 12:16 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/unexpectedsex-party-destroys-pricy-chelsea-apartment-article-1.1723825.
273. See Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/terms (last updated Sept. 30,
2016); Uber Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last visited
Feb. 16, 2017).
274. See Emily Badger, The Strange Tale of an Uber Car Crash and What It Means for the
Future of Auto Insurance, CITYLAB (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/commute/
2013/09/real-future-ride-sharing-may-all-come-down-insurance/6832/ (“Some of them, like
Uber, argue that they have created primarily technology platforms, modern-day phone books that
connect people who already have cars (or car services) to people who want to ride in them.”).
275. See JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC
140–41 (2001) (including Napster attorney David Boies’ statement to Wired magazine in which
he described Napster as a “directory-service provider”).
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Those parties litigated those cases under copyright law, which is a strict
liability offense that includes a concept of secondary liability where
facilitators have knowledge and control over infringing activities.276 In
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,277 the Supreme
Court imposed liability even when the P2P services were fully
distributed.278 The Court concluded that awareness and encouragement
of widespread infringement was sufficient, even if the services had no
records of any individual transaction.279
The “directory” argument has met with stiff resistance. It is formally
true that Uber and Lyft own no cars and Airbnb owns no hotels, but they
provide a service offering that competes directly with those who do.
Riders look for “an Uber,” not a directory of drivers who happen to be
nearby. The basic value proposition of on-demand services, and the
Internet of the World more broadly, is the ability to stitch together
otherwise independent entities into a seamless network.280 This is, after
all, how companies such as Uber and Airbnb have grown so fast and
transformed markets so dramatically. The argument that they are merely
incidental facilitators of direct transactions between individuals flies in
the face of reality.
Perhaps more importantly, the On-Demand Economy depends on
trust.281 For most individuals to feel comfortable stepping into a
stranger’s car or apartment, they need to have some confidence above and
beyond ordinary social mores. On-demand providers achieve this
primarily through reputation and rating systems that overcome classic
information asymmetries.282 They also screen providers in their network,
276. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30
(2005); Sverker K. Hgberg, Note, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary Liability
in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 911 (2006).
277. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
278. See id. at 939 (holding that defendant’s efforts to supply services was sufficient to
warrant liability).
279. See id. at 923–24.
280. See supra Section I.A. This aspect of the Internet of the World represents the
continuation of forces enabling social production, which have been evident since the beginning
of the commercial internet era. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 99 (2006).
281. See Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each Other,
WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/;
Stephen Ufford, The Future of the Sharing Economy Depends on Trust, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2015,
9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2015/02/10/the-future-of-the-sharing-economydepends-on-trust/.
282. See Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational
Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem,” 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 830, 855 (2016)
(explaining how reputation and rating systems allow drivers and passengers to gain information
about the other); Ufford, supra note 281.
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and remove those who engage in misconduct or provide poor service.283
Customers are therefore trusting the platform, not the individual
providers. As a practical matter, individual providers of on-demand
services may not have the resources to fully compensate users for
injuries.284 Unsurprisingly, therefore, neither regulators nor users have
been satisfied that on-demand providers can shift liability to providers in
their networks.285
2. Intermediaries and Their Providers
Another dimension concerns the legal relationship between the
frontline providers and the on-demand platforms. For services such as
Uber and Lyft, the question is whether the individuals who interact with
customers should be classified as employees or independent
contractors.286 Classification as employees, which the on-demand
platforms generally resist,287 could among other things impose
respondeat superior liability for those employees’ actions.288 More
generally, it would establish the networks as the primary service
providers, rather than merely coordination tools, for collections of
independent entrepreneurs. A decision to categorize Uber and Lyft
drivers therefore also functions to categorize Uber and Lyft.
The “Internet of Things” conception of on-demand services
controlling formerly unconnected objects through the network289
potentially cuts in both directions here. On the one hand, emphasizing the
constitutive and directive role of the on-demand software platform, with
the people at the edges operating as mere extensions, cuts against the
story that the workers are independent contractors who just happen to use
a mobile app. On the other hand, providers will be less interested in
283. Thierer et al., supra note 282, at 860.
284. See Katz, supra note 3, at 1099–1100.
285. See id. at 1072–73.
286. See, e.g., Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Trying
to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 53, 68 & n.120 (2015)
(discussing two class action lawsuits in which Uber and Lyft drivers sought classification as
employees). Separate from the legal concern, some critics of the On-Demand Economy raise the
concern that these businesses undermine worker protections. See Robert Reich, Uber, Airbnb, and
the “Share-the-Scraps” Economy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Robert-Reich/2015/0203/Uber-Airbnb-and-the-share-thescraps-economy.
287. In some cases, on-demand services have chosen to take on employees voluntarily, so
that they can exercise greater control and reduce churn of frontline providers. See Stone, supra
note 11.
288. See Jessica L. Hubley, Online Consent and the On-Demand Economy: An Approach for
the Millennial Circumstance, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (2016).
289. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (describing on-demand platforms as
examples of the Internet of Things).
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treating workers as employees if they see them as fungible cogs in a
system. The Internet of the World dramatically alters the dimension that
traditionally distinguishes employees from contractors: control.290
Courts have not definitively resolved the worker classification
issue.291 A class action lawsuit in California arguing that ride-hailing
platform drivers are employees survived summary judgment in spring
2015, with a trial set for June 2016.292 The California Labor Commission
ruled in 2015 that Uber drivers are employees;293 Uber appealed. As with
the regulatory classification of on-demand services, a new legal category
with elements of both employees and independent contractors may
ultimately be needed.294 A key question will be the degree of
responsibility the platform providers should assume.
However courts resolve the labor classification, the broader issue is
what level of responsibility should inure to new kinds of platforms.
Among the signal innovations of the Internet of the World is the way it
engenders novel forms of intermediation. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and other
on-demand services all use mobile devices and networked software to
turn individual service providers into arms of centralized platforms.
Internet of Things services do the same with sensor devices.295 When
something goes wrong, it is no longer a question of design or
manufacturing flaws in individual products. For example, a software
glitch at the beginning of 2016 caused widespread failures of Nest
network-connected adaptive thermostats in the middle of winter, leaving
290. See Sprague, supra note 286, at 53 (identifying control as a critical factor in
distinguishing employees from independent contractors).
291. See Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a
Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/ubercontests-california-labor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html; Carrie Mihalcik,
Lyft Pays $12M to Settle Class Action Suit with California Drivers, CNET (Jan. 27, 2016,
2:07 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/lyft-pays-12m-to-settle-class-action-suit-with-californiadrivers; James Surowiecki, Gigs with Benefits, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits.
292. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see
also Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Loses Bid to Pause Drivers Group Lawsuit as Trial Looms,
BLOOMBERG: TECH (Jan. 27, 2016, 3:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-0127/uber-loses-bid-to-pause-california-drivers-group-lawsuit (noting that Uber failed to halt
proceedings while it appeals a decision expanding the size of the class).
293. See Isaac & Singer, supra note 291.
294. See, e.g., Sprague, supra note 286, at 72–76 (advocating a new test based on whether
the on-demand platforms depend on the workers, rather than the reverse); Justin Fox, Uber and
the Not-Quite-Independent Contractor, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (June 23, 2015, 11:59 AM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-23/uber-drivers-are-neither-employees-norcontractors; Lauren Weber, What If There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent Contractor,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-newtype-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831.
295. See supra Part I.
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owners worried about the effects of freezing houses on small children and
pipes.296 Software vendors such as Microsoft have successfully avoided
liability for defects and security flaws, based on contractual disclaimers
and limitations on liability,297 but the Internet of the World potentially
turns everything into a software system.
3. The Safe Harbors of Sections 230 and 512
As with the other current legal and regulatory debates, there is a handy
precedent in the annals of cyberlaw. In the Congressional compromise to
incorporate the CDA into the bicameral version of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,298 Congress paired the provisions
imposing liability for online indecency and obscenity with provisions
protecting online intermediaries.299 The latter language, codified as
Section 230 of Title 47 of the U.S. Code, includes two main elements.
The first recites a Congressional desire to preserve the unregulated
Internet.300 This language, unmoored from its companion provisions on
indecency, has been cited ever since in support of non-regulatory
positions toward online services.301
The second component of Section 230 is the safe harbor regime.
Online intermediaries are not considered publishers or speakers of
information provided on their services by other content providers,
including individuals.302 Section 230 protects them against liability for
taking good faith efforts to block inappropriate or harmful material,
which otherwise might be seen as evidence they can exercise editorial
control.303 By immunizing intermediaries for such “good Samaritan”
actions, the law facilitated dialogue between these providers and those
seeking removal of materials. The unanimous Supreme Court decision in
Reno v. ACLU struck the substantive provisions of the CDA restricting
indecent online speech.304 However, Section 230 remained good law.

296. See Nick Bilton, Nest Thermostat Glitch Leaves Users in the Cold, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/fashion/nest-thermostat-glitch-battery-dies
-software-freeze.html.
297. See 68 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2017); Michael
D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD.
L. REV. 425, 436–38 (2008).
298. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, 134–
35 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012)).
299. See Werbach, Off the Hook, supra note 196, at 556–57 & n.131.
300. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b).
301. See Werbach, Off the Hook, supra note 196, at 554–55.
302. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)–(d).
303. Id.
304. 521 U.S. 844, 849, 883 (1997).
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Section 230 expressly does not apply to copyright violations.305
However, Congress created a similar safe harbor structure under Section
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.306 There, providers enjoy
a safe harbor from liability for content provided by others so long as they
designate an agent to receive complaints about copyright infringement,
take down infringing material when notified, and offer subscribers the
opportunity for a counter-notification if material was taken down in
error.307
These safe harbor provisions resulted from compromises between
those worried about letting intermediaries off the hook for enabling
distribution of harmful or infringing material and those worried about
chilling effects to legitimate speech and commerce.308 Neither side got
exactly what it wanted, especially in the copyright context, but the
arrangements were important foundations for the subsequent growth of
online services and e-commerce.
In the years since 1996, the Section 230 safe harbor has become a
significant protector of online intermediaries against a raft of legal claims
based on the actions of their users. Although not without its critics,309
Section 230 has been labeled one of the most important legislative
enactments facilitating the growth of online services and e-commerce.310
Parties have challenged its invocation in hundreds of cases, and while
courts have not always been consistent, the safe harbor has been an
effective shield against an extraordinarily broad array of claims.311
305. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012).
306. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–78 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (2012)).
307. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
308. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 621–22 (2006).
309. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 230 (2006) (describing how indirect liability is
preferable where the potentially liable party is in a good position to detect and deter bad acts, such
as in the employment context); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 250 (2005) (proposing a “mature scheme
of regulation that limits the social costs of illegal Internet conduct in the most cost-effective
manner”).
310. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 373, 379–80 (2010); H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity:
Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 369 (2008); Mark
A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 102–
03 (2007); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support of Appellees
Google, Inc. et al. at 4–6, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302).
311. See Ardia, supra note 310, at 411, 414.
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Section 230 covers interactive computer services, which “provide[] or
enable[] computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically . . . access to the Internet.”312 It protects internet
service providers and all manner of online content and application
services, but not services delivered in the physical world.313 The question
is therefore what should be learned from the historical experience, and
how government should craft an intermediary liability or safe harbor
regime for the new generation of platforms.
4. Defining Platform Responsibilities
Intermediaries are often the best, if not the only, entities able to police
behavior of participants in their network. Only they have visibility across
the ecosystem and real-time data on activities of all participants.314
Platform providers may be the only entities capable of taking effective
enforcement action against those who cause injuries, or they may be the
only actor involved with sufficient resources to compensate the injured.
The threat of liability creates a strong incentive for platforms to screen
participants and take action against those who cause harm.315
On the other hand, excessive liability risk can prevent providers from
offering valuable services or create perverse incentives. Congress
designed the Section 230 safe harbor to address the concern that an
intermediary would avoid policing activity out of fear that it would
become liable as a publisher for exercising editorial control.316 Congress
drafted the safe harbor provisions of the 1990s, especially the Section 512
notice and takedown language for copyright infringement, to balance
these concerns.317 The legal regime shapes business models as much as it
allocates responsibilities for compensation.318
312. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
313. Airbnb has asserted that it falls within the Section 230 safe harbor, although this claim
has not been tested. See Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 149, 164 (2015) (noting that Section 230 is one of the most influential reasons why
Airbnb can succeed); see also Lisa Fickenscher, Hotels Girding for a Fight Against Airbnb,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20130819/
HOSPITALITY_TOURISM/130819909/hotels-girding-for-a-fight-against-airbnb (explaining
that regulatory authorities have hesitated to sue Airbnb because of the Section 230 safe harbor).
314. See Ardia, supra note 310, at 377 (“[P]rivate intermediaries transport, host, and index
tens of billions of pages of content online.”).
315. Macmurdo, supra note 267, at 326.
316. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997); Ardia, supra note
310, at 410 (stating that one purpose of the amendment that became the Section 230 safe harbor
was “encouraging private efforts to deal with Internet indecency”).
317. See Ardia, supra note 310, at 391 n.66.
318. The pattern continues to this day. For example, the anonymous location-based
messaging service YikYak, created in late 2013, has provoked controversy on many college
campuses due to abusive and threatening messages. Thanks to Section 230, it has not been held
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Something similar could help to align incentives for networked
businesses of the new internet economy to take appropriate responsibility
as intermediaries, without burdening them with excessive liability.319 As
with the other issues, the question should be how to ensure appropriate
protection for customers in the most efficient and effective way, while
still supporting innovation and growth of new services.
When pressed, on-demand providers have been willing to step in with
creative solutions. Following the 2011 incident, Airbnb began offering a
$1 million “Protection Guarantee” for its hosts.320 This amount is in
addition to renters’ or homeowners’ insurance, which sometimes does not
apply when hosts rent out space to third parties.321 In India, Uber
introduced a “panic button” for riders to address concerns about sexual
assaults by drivers.322
Another mechanism is private insurance. On-demand service
providers often only have personal insurance policies, which are not welladapted to the commercial services they are offering.323 Commercial
policies, however, generally are not designed for individuals acting as
drivers or residential hosts on an episodic, part-time basis.324 And even
when providers have insurance, the question is whether it applies any
time they use the on-demand app or only when they interact with a
customer.325 These limitations are gradually falling away, in part due to
government action. One of the key developments allowing adoption of
TNC laws has been negotiation of a compromise between ride-hailing
companies and insurance companies regarding insurance requirements
for drivers.326 Most states have used the resulting model language to
liable for defamatory content posted by its users, but it has been able to remove content or turn
users over to law enforcement authorities in cases of serious criminal activity or physical danger.
See Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed That Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn’t Telling, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/popular-yik-yak-app-confersanonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html.
319. See Katz, supra note 3, at 1106–07.
320. See The $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee (last
visited Mar. 28, 2017).
321. Id.
322. Associated Press, Uber Introduces “Panic Button” in India, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2015,
7:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/09/uber-introduces-panic-buttonin-india.
323. See Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation:
Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, 88 (2014).
324. Id.
325. See id. This issue is known as the “insurance gap.” Id.
326. See Anthony R. O’Donnell, Insurer-TNC Compromise Paves Way for Rideshare
Insurance Regulation, INS. INNOVATION REP. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://iireporter.com/insurer-tnccompromise-paves-way-for-rideshare-insurance-regulation.
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impose mandatory insurance requirements on drivers, and in response,
insurance companies have begun to offer policies tailored to the new
business model.327
The network neutrality experience shows that a substantial segment
of internet users and startups may advocate rules that place greater
obligations on service providers, despite their instinctive resistance to
government regulation.328 Indeed, opponents of regulation for on-demand
services have begun to endorse measures to protect workers and
consumers.329 In November 2015, founders or CEOs of several ondemand providers including Lyft, Handy, and Instacart signed onto a
letter urging the creation of new social safety net mechanisms for ondemand workers.330
IV. WE CAN WORK IT OUT
The pioneers of the On-Demand Economy, Internet of Things, and
Big Data face a similar challenge to Napster and YouTube. Those that
think they can ignore or challenge existing laws indefinitely may find
themselves in jeopardy. Those that find ways to align interests will
succeed. Yet at the same time, policymakers who think they can simply
extend old rules to new services will encounter both legal and practical
difficulties. Once government is at the table and both sides come forward
with good faith, together they can and will develop creative solutions.
A. The Digital Dichotomy
In 1999, writer Andrew Shapiro published The Control Revolution, a
perceptive examination of the tensions between the decentralizing power
of the internet and the centralizing pressures of legal and business
forces.331 Shapiro’s thesis was that the rise of online activity would

327. See, e.g., California Commissioner OKs New Insurance Products to Fill Ridesharing
Gap, INS. J. (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2016/01/21/
395994.htm (describing how USAA and State Farm recently introduced gap-closing insurance to
Uber and Lyft drivers in California).
328. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
329. Arun Sundararajan, A Safety Net Fit for the Sharing Economy, FIN. TIMES (June 22,
2015, 6:07 PM), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4af5/d34faa19590cfdb4ba127e7b5da84
e2e736a.pdf.
330. See Agence France Press, “Sharing Economy” Firms Urge Safety Net for Workers,
YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/sharing-economy-firms-urgesafety-net-workers-162802278.html.
331. See generally ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1999) (arguing that
there has been a shift of control due to society’s ever-increasing use of the internet). This finding
reflects deeper structures of networked activities. A similar pattern of alternating centralization
and decentralization explains the development of the infrastructure of the internet, which network
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produce a zig-zag path of development.332 Explosions of bottom-up
innovation would provoke excessive regulation, which in turn birthed
new efforts to circumvent legal and other constraints.333 Both the upstarts
and the establishment, Shapiro argued, were susceptible to “oversteer,” a
tendency to over-correct for legitimate problems.334 Both sides would
eventually move to the middle as they recognized the need for balance,
although the process of getting there might be costly.335
The internet’s development in the twenty-first century has played out
largely as Shapiro predicted. From Napster to PayPal to YouTube to
Skype to Facebook, the great innovative business success stories
involved waves of hype about unstoppable disruption alternating with
periods of backlash about threats to individuals and well-functioning
markets.336 Like a pendulum gradually narrowing its arc, extreme
libertarianism and regulatory revanchism gradually gave way to practical
solutions in the middle.337 This story describes the website-dominated era
of Web 1.0 as well as the social/mobile/app world of Web 2.0. There is
every reason to expect the pattern to continue.
The problems described in The Control Revolution can be traced to a
core misunderstanding: the digital dichotomy.338 The starting point of this
way of thinking is that online transactions or connections are
ontologically different than interactions in the “real world.”339 To this
perspective, e-commerce is distinct from brick-and-mortar commerce,
and online social networks are distinct from in-person interaction.
When it comes to law and regulation, the digital dichotomy suggests
that virtual and physical interactions belong in distinct categories. This in
turn forces scholars, government officials, and industry leaders to argue
about what goes on either side of the line and what consequences flow
science can explain. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself
Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 346 (2008).
332. See SHAPIRO, supra note 331, at xiii.
333. See id. at xiii–iv.
334. See id. at xiii–xiv.
335. See id. at xiv.
336. See supra Section III.A.
337. See supra Section III.A.
338. Others have used this term in unrelated ways, both in legal analysis and to describe
business developments. See, e.g., Competition in the Evolving Digital Marketplace: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 39 (2010) (testimony of Scott Cleland, President, Precursor LLP) (using the term digital
dichotomy to discuss how the internet, unlike traditional business, has moved away from
competition to monopoly as opposed to the other way around).
339. Professor Orin Kerr makes a related point about the confusion between the internet as
a virtual space and as a physical network. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 (2003).
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from that determination.340 Established rules were written for the old
world of physical activities, so the new online analogues appear to exist
in a legal vacuum. The policy debate becomes a fight over whether they
should be either “regulated” (under the old rules) or “unregulated,”341
despite the problems of such artificially sharp divisions.342 The question
becomes which of those outcomes one fears the most.
The fact that online businesses are new and operate in the ephemeral
world of the internet blinds us to the ways that the behaviors and market
structures involved are familiar. This, in turn, delays the inevitable
recognition that the desirable outcome is a balanced solution that
addresses the legitimate interests of industry, governments, and
individuals. As cyberspace mediates more and more domains of human
activity, the pattern repeats itself. Decades into the internet revolution,
new business functions and social patterns are still making their way
online.
The emerging Internet of the World represents the final destruction of
artificial divisions between the real and the virtual. Physical entities
become extensions or information feeds for digital processors. The
internet changes the delivery of services, even though those services
occur entirely in the physical world. And it is no longer just large,
centralized workforces such as Amazon’s warehouse employees who
provide these digitally-mediated services; it can be individuals working
part time on their own hours, enabled through online marketplaces.
Where before it was possible to talk of a “brick and mortar” hotel
chain such as Hilton competing against a purely digital aggregator such
as Expedia, it becomes much harder to classify the ecosystem around
Airbnb. Many of the advantages previously reserved for digital goods
such as iTunes’ songs or Netflix’s movies are now available to physical
goods and local services provided by humans. At some point, there is
virtually no asset in a growing number of categories that cannot be
340. I have made a similar point about the siloed structure of telecommunications regulation
in an earlier paper. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 37, 40–44 (2002).
341. See Oxman, supra note 156, at 3 (arguing for continued internet deregulation).
342. See Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1764 (2010) (discussing
problems arising from the FCC’s “all or nothing” approach to applying communications
regulation to internet-based services); see generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws,
102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014) (describing difficulties when laws create all-or-nothing
distinctions). Not all cyberlaw scholarship operates in such Manichean terms. Lawrence Lessig’s
seminal book, Code, for example, describes four forces that regulate behavior: law, norms, the
market, and architecture. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 86–89 (1999). While cyberspace differs
from the physical world because of the prevalence of code regulation (the cyber equivalent of
architecture), his point is not that one form of regulation is good and the others are bad; all forms
of regulation have their place. Id.
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delivered on demand through digital systems. And in response,
established businesses are turning over new digital leaves. Successful
brick-and-mortar retailers such as Wal-Mart have long depended on
advanced logistics, customer analytics, and other data-driven software
systems.343 Now, in the face of the On-Demand Economy rippling
through the transportation sector, even companies as decisively
traditionally rooted in the physical world as Ford and General Motors are
positioning themselves as software-driven “smart mobility” providers.344
The fact that on-demand services so thoroughly bridge the physical
and the digital is what generates so much confusion and controversy in
the area of regulation. The idea that digital systems are strange and new
and different leads to the notion that they can escape the gravitational
forces of established legal regimes.345 That same mental model leads
others to see these services as threatening, unfamiliar, and directed
toward undermining important public policy protections. Both idealists
and realists assume that established legal and regulatory institutions can
remain intact: The new services either ignore them or comply with
them.346 Time and time again, the real outcome has involved engagement
and evolution on both sides.347
The oft-repeated mantra that law and regulation move more slowly
than technology should not be the end of the discussion. Both sides of the
equation can be examined more closely. The practical effects of
technological change are felt over a period of time, as the technology
diffuses and broader segments of society adopt it.348 More importantly,
343. See Karl Flinders, Walmart’s Strong IT Will Be Key in Strategic Shift,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Jan. 11, 2010, 2:29 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/
news/1280091811/Walmarts-strong-IT-will-be-key-in-strategic-shift (“Walmart runs some of
the most advanced systems of any company in the world . . . .”).
344. See Steven Levy, Bill Ford Isn’t Scared of Apple, BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 10, 2016),
https://backchannel.com/bill-ford-isn-t-scared-of-apple-9822fd3ecb78#.6r0o86f68; see, e.g.,
Mike Isaac, General Motors, Gazing at Future, Invests $500 Million in Lyft, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/technology/gm-invests-in-lyft.html?_r=0
(discussing GM’s investment in Lyft and their plan to develop short-term car rental hubs across
the United States).
345. Even John Perry Barlow, the avatar of an independent realm of cyberspace, now
recognizes that his Declaration drew too sharp a dividing line between the real and the virtual:
“If I were writing it today, I would make it much more clear that the Internet and the physical
world are deeply connected in the same way that the mind and body are connected.” John Perry
Barlow (john_perry_barlow), REDDIT (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/
comments/44srf4/im_john_perry_barlow_cofounder_of_eff_and_freedom/.
346. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 3, at 7 (noting the difficulty regulatory institutions
have when attempting to regulate sharing economy businesses).
347. See, e.g., Sofia Ranchordás, Innovation-Friendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation,
the Sunrise of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS 201, 216 (2015).
348. See Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH.
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regulators can design legal regimes that provide greater flexibility when
addressing fast-changing environments.349 The celebration of innovation
should not obscure the principle that law exists to protect core societal
values precisely because they do not change.
B. ICANN and the Dangers of Institutional Exceptionalism
The collapse of the digital dichotomy also undermines the arguments
for new institutions specially designed to encompass online activity.
Even when legislatures or courts adopt distinctive rules for new
technological contexts, such as the Section 230 safe harbor for online
services,350 they still operate within traditional procedural and political
boundaries. By contrast, creating new institutions from scratch opens up
a Pandora’s Box. The best example of the risks involved is ICANN, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
One of the remarkable aspects of the internet in the late 1990s was its
emergence as a platform for massive levels of commercial activity on top
of a technical governance structure largely run by volunteers and groups
of engineers. In particular, a single man, computer scientist Jon Postel,
who had volunteered for the job years before, oversaw the entire
addressing system that ensured that information got to the right place.351
Similarly, a small technology contractor, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI),
got the job of registering domain names with the main suffixes, through
a contract with the National Science Foundation.352 This largely ad hoc
system eventually became untenable. Critics challenged NSI’s policies,
its private control over public functions, its growing profits from
registration fees, and the lack of attention to technical concerns such as
security and depletion of available addresses.353 Organizations and policy
makers outside the United States also questioned why an American
government contractor controlled such an important function for the
global internet.354

REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keeppace-with-technology/ (discussing the effect the printing press had on Medieval and Roman
society over the course of centuries).
349. See Ranchordás, supra note 347, at 201, 204–05 (advocating techniques such as sunset
clauses and experimental legislation to overcome the “pacing problem” of law and technology).
350. 57 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
351. See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING
OF CYBERSPACE § 5.2.1 (2002).
352. See id. § 5.5.2.
353. See id. §§ 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.2.
354. See id. §§ 6.3.1, 6.3.2. Some domain name suffixes, such as “.uk,” are expressly national
and generally controlled by authorities in that jurisdiction. Glossary, ICANN,
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/glossary-2014-02-03-en#g (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
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Unlike most of the issues discussed so far, domain name management
is inherently international.355 Because no nation has legal authority
beyond its borders absent some voluntary arrangement such as a treaty,
preemption of excessive regulatory action by other governments, along
the lines of the Internet Tax Freedom Act,356 was not an option. The
United States or other countries and private actors committed to the
openness of cyberspace could not simply prohibit nations from
interfering. Instead, they concluded, a new institution had to be
constructed.357
In 1998, the Internet Society, a non-profit technical organization,
joined forces with several other groups as well as the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), to adopt a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
for management of internet addressing.358 On the one hand, the MOU,
whose eighty signatories were predominantly private organizations, was
an effort in the cyberlibertarian vein to remove online activities from the
realm of territorial governments.359 On the other hand, because it created
new organizations formally attached to the ITU and WIPO, both of which
are treaty organizations comprised of nation-states, U.S. officials
criticized the MOU for giving too much power to governments.360 While
the United States had refrained from using its stewardship over internet
addressing to impose content restrictions or other regulations on the
internet, other governments might not be so hesitant.
In response, the United States rejected the MOU and began a process
that eventually resulted in transfer of management over the domain name
system and other technical aspects of internet governance to a newlycreated organization called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN).361 ICANN is formally incorporated as a private
California non-profit corporation, but it has a complicated governance
structure that includes representation from various stakeholder groups as
However, generic top-level domains (gTLDs) such as “.com” have no specific geographical
designation. Id.
355. MUELLER, supra note 351, § 8.1.1.
356. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–2719 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151
(2012)).
357. MUELLER, supra note 351, § 8.1.3.
358. See Press Release, Int’l Telecomm. Union, Changes to Internet Domain Names Will
Encourage
Competition,
Foster
Growth
and
Stability
(Apr.
29,
1997),
http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press_releases//1997/itu-07.html.
359. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 102, at 36–43.
360. See The Internet Domain Name System (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Basic
Research of the House Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong. 10–11 (1997) (testimony of Larry Irving,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information).
361. See MUELLER, supra note 351, §§ 10.1–10.2.
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well as national governments.362 The U.S. Department of Commerce,
which succeeded the National Science Foundation, controls the critical
contract with ICANN for management of the “root server” that all other
name servers on the internet ultimately look to for valid addresses.363 Yet
even though ICANN was a creation of the United States and depended
on a government contract, the United States structured and promoted it
as an exercise in internet self-governance.364
ICANN thus represents the worst aspects of cyberlibertarianism and
cyber-realism. It views itself in aspirational terms as an independent
collective voice of the will of the people of cyberspace.365 Yet it also
represents a naked exercise of power politics by the United States, which
in turn sought to head off intervention from other governments.366 The
result is an institution that lacks accountability and has lurched from
controversy to controversy.367
Despite its frequent protestations that it is purely a technical
management organization, ICANN has relentlessly grown its staff,
budget, and scope of authority.368 Several times, there have been efforts
to reconstitute or replace ICANN with an organization under the United
Nations, or otherwise led by governmental representatives, who have
only an advisory role in the current system.369 Various initiatives such as
the World Summit on the Information Society, Internet Governance
Forum, NetMundial, and World Internet Conference have advocated a
largely government-dominated vision of internet governance in response
to ICANN’s U.S.-centricity.
Most American technology companies opposed the efforts to
decouple ICANN from its special relationship to the U.S. government.
Their concern was that other countries with weaker protections for free
expression could use a government-controlled ICANN to push for
limitations on the free flow of information online. At the same time, direct
interventions by the United States, as when it forced ICANN to delay
362. Id. § 8 tbl.8.1.
363. See id. § 9.4.
364. See Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting Through the Debris of
“Self-Regulation,” 1 INFO 497, 498 (1999).
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. See id.; A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 29 (2000); John Palfrey, The End of the
Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
409, 429, 460 (2004); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J.
187, 210 (2000).
368. See Palfrey, supra note 367, at 464.
369. See LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 227–29 (2014);
MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES 248–50 (2010).
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plans for a dot-XXX top-level domain for pornographic material,370
continue to rankle those who envision a self-governing or truly global
institution. The U.S. government is currently attempting to disengage
from ICANN, though it faces arguments that it should continue this
guardian role.371
ICANN’s most significant recent initiative is the unveiling of a variety
of new generic top-level domains.372 The ponderous eight-year process
involved forty-seven requests for comment,373 despite little evidence of
real demand.374 Companies were required to pay a non-refundable
$185,000 deposit to reserve new domains and substantial ongoing fees
for those approved. The process as a whole generated tens of millions of
dollars for the ICANN treasury but few clear benefits for internet users.375
ICANN illustrates what happens when too much credence is given to
calls for new institutions and insufficient attention is paid to the
potentially constructive role of old-fashioned government agencies in
providing oversight, ensuring procedural safeguards, and playing a
convening role for resolution of disputes. If the strategic purpose of
ICANN was, like the Internet Tax Freedom Act, to employ the power of
the U.S. government as a firewall against intrusive actions by other
governments, it has at most served to delay and channel those efforts. If
it was to demonstrate the potential of internet self-governance, it surely
failed.376
An alternative to the ICANN approach of creating a new institution
for innovative online activity is to enable private governance activity
under the umbrella of public regulatory oversight. There are several
370. See Jonathan Weinberg, Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization:” ICANN and
the GAC, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. REV. 189, 201–07 (2011).
371. See Alina Selyukh, Internet Experts Submit Draft Plan for U.S. to Cede Domain
Oversight, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2015, 3:24 pm), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/03/usainternet-icann-idUSL1N10E0ZZ20150803.
372. See Press Release, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers, Internet Domain
Name Expansion Now Underway (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.icann.org/resources/pressmaterial/release-2013-10-23-en.
373. See Daniela Michele Spencer, Note, Much Ado About Nothing: ICANN's New gTLDs,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 865 (2014).
374. See MICHAEL L. KATZ ET AL., ICANN, ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EXPANSION
OF GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN NAMES 12 (2010), http://archive.icann.org/en/topics/newgtlds/phase-two-economic-considerations-03dec10-en.pdf.
375. See Wade Roush, ICANN’s Boondoggle, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 21, 2012),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/428911/icanns-boondoggle/.
376. To be fair, ICANN involved international activity, over which the U.S. government
could not simply assert its authority and be done. See BERIN SZOKA ET AL., TECH FREEDOM,
ICANN TRANSITION IS PREMATURE (2016), http://docs.techfreedom.org/TF_White_
Paper_IANA_Transition.pdf. The problem was the assumption that the new institution could
create its own rules, without a strong initial oversight process and clearly-defined safeguards.
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variants of self-regulation, co-regulation, and delegated regulation that
free private actors from the inefficiencies of direct government mandates
while still ensuring that public interest obligations are met.377 These
approaches involve an active role for government, especially at the initial
stages, in defining essential conditions and parameters, while giving
market participants flexibility in the technological solutions they choose
to meet them.
Both in the dot-com era and more recently, established governance
and regulatory mechanisms have proven sufficiently adaptable to address
new issues raised by innovative, fast-growing startups. Working through
the issues for on-demand services will be challenging. The need for new
flexibility and new rules should not, however, be equated with the
inherent superiority of new legal institutions. Existing regulators, such as
local taxi commissions, may be obstinate and captured by incumbents,
but they are subject to procedural protections and political influences that
may correct for such flaws. The way that Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb have
gradually reached accommodations through local negotiations and state
preemptive legislation suggests these factors can be influential when the
startups are willing to come to the table.
C. What Cyberlaw Should Teach
Although cyberlibertarianism and anti-libertarian realism were major
threads in early cyberlaw scholarship, they were not the only viewpoints,
especially after the turn of the millennium. Another group of scholars,
growing more prominent over time, offered more nuanced accounts that
rejected the duality of cyberspace and real space, yet retained aspects of
cyber-exceptionalism.378 Underlying this perspective was an important
realization: The presupposition of the digital dichotomy was false.
Cyberspace and real space were no longer distinct from one another (if
they ever were).
The shift in scholarship mirrored shifts in the world at large. In the
early days of the commercial internet, “going online” meant going to a
computer at a fixed location, initiating a connection on a dial-up modem,
and loading special software to request data from remote websites.
Today, users are likely to carry internet-connected devices with them in
the form of smartphones, laptops, and tablets; even the fixed-location
computers use “always-on” broadband connections; every major
377. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-toPeer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 129 (2015).
378. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Virtual Borders: The Interdependence of Real and
Virtual Worlds, FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 6, 2006), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/
fm/article/view/1312/1232%3BLastowka; see also Kerr, supra note 339, at 357 (differentiating
the “internal” perspective of internet users from the “external” perspective of the operation of the
network).
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operating system and software application has built-in internet
connections; and the line between “client” and “server” is increasingly
blurred into “the cloud.” Google Maps, which with a single click changes
between a computer-generated map and satellite imagery of the user’s
GPS-tracked real-time location, epitomizes this fusion of virtual and real
in the second-generation internet.
In such a world, it became more and more difficult to suggest that
online interactions did not have substantial spill-over effects on both
personal and commercial relationships in the physical world, making
strong segregation of their legal regimes untenable. At the same time, it
became harder and harder to treat cyberspace as illusory and disregard it
by applying longstanding legal principles.
A final contextual reason for the shift in internet policy was the
broader bending of the arc of regulatory views, from President Ronald
Reagan’s mantra that government was the problem not the solution379 to
President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore’s efforts to reinvent
government380 to President Barack Obama’s defense of government’s
role in reducing inequality.381 The political and intellectual climates today
are more hospitable to solutions that recognize both the legitimate role of
government and the legitimate criticisms of government’s flaws.
The “post-realist” thread in cyberlaw scholarship goes back to its early
days but was lost in the struggle between cyberlibertarians and realists.
The same year as author Andrew Shapiro published The Control
Revolution, Professor Lessig published an article in the Harvard Law
Review titled, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach.382 The
title referred to a debate between Lessig and Judge Frank Easterbrook,
who had criticized the cyberlaw project as comparable to an effort in the
nineteenth century to develop a “law of the horse.”383 There was, Judge
Easterbrook argued, nothing inherently distinctive about the legal
considerations for online transactions; established doctrinal frameworks
such as contracts and torts would do.384 It was misleading to focus on the
technological aspects in legal analysis, in his view.
In his article, Lessig defended cyberlaw with an early version of the
arguments he would make more famously in his book, Code, and Other
379. See Charles Levine, The Federal Government in the Year 2000: Administrative
Legacies of the Reagan Years, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 195, 195, 198–99 (1986).
380. See David Osborne, Reinventing Government, 16 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV.
349, 349 (1993).
381. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-presidentstate-union-address-january-20-2015.
382. Lessig, supra note 6.
383. Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 207.
384. See id.
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Laws of Cyberspace.385 The digital code of software and the Internet,
Lessig argued, offered an alternative regulatory system in competition
with state-defined law.386 Standards of transparency and overreach could
be applied to evaluate both.387 In particular cases, software code might be
more or less desirable than legal code in regulating behavior.388 It would
be wrong, however, simply to ignore the technological dimension.
Among the valuable aspects of Lessig’s framework, which remains
foundational even as other early cyberlaw work became a historical
curiosity, is that it is not one of cyber-exceptionalism. Lessig granted
Judge Easterbrook’s point that digital interactions were no different than
real-space ones.389 There was no need, as Barlow and others advocated,
for government categorically to “leave cyberspace alone.”390 Traditional
legal rules should be employed where they are the most effective and
socially desirable solution. In fact, by regulating activity without the
transparency and opportunities for appeal built into formal legal
decisions, software code was in some ways the more dangerous tool.391
In this way, Lessig avoided the digital dichotomy.
Extending the approach of The Law of the Horse to the current
environment, both governmental and software-based mechanisms have a
role to play in resolving the growing controversies about the on-demand
economy. For on-demand businesses, the question is how to ensure that
public policy objectives such as rider safety and consumer protection are
met without the restrictive licensing and verification procedures existing
regulators employ.392 Using Lessig’s two criteria, the question should be
which mode of regulation is most transparent and least subject to
overreach.393 Transparency can be thought of as a proxy for procedural
fairness: Are the decision rules subject to evaluation and critique?
Overreach is a substantive criterion analogous to Shapiro’s “overseer”:
Do the rules go farther than necessary to address the policy concern?
Government regulation involves well-understood dangers, but nongovernmental regulation has limitations as well.
Latter-day cyberlibertarians claim that many of the market failures
that previously justified regulatory solutions can now be addressed
385. LESSIG, supra note 342; Lessig, supra note 6, at 502.
386. See Lessig, supra note 6, at 506.
387. See id. at 541.
388. See id. at 534.
389. See id. at 502.
390. Barlow, supra note 74.
391. See id.
392. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 3, at 12–31 (distinguishing between protectionist
restrictions on on-demand services which should be eliminated and rules addressing legitimate
policy concerns such as market failures, externalities, and information asymmetries).
393. See id.
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through technology.394 For example, two-sided reputation and rating
systems backed by analytics can protect both consumers and workers
from abuses that previously called for government mandates.395 There is
definitely some validity to this view. However, algorithms have their
limitations. Sometimes they introduce new public policy concerns. For
example, Harvard computer scientist Latanya Sweeney found that
algorithmically selected Google AdSense advertisements returned ads
implying prior arrest records more frequently for users with
stereotypically African-American than White names, even when those
users had no criminal record.396 The algorithms were not deliberately
biased, but they produced what might be considered discriminatory
results.397 Researchers have found similar discriminatory effects in
Airbnb’s reputation system.398
The problem with reputation systems, under Lessig’s criteria, is that
they are opaque. Either the platform operator keeps the data private, or in
the case of more sophisticated systems employing predictive analytics,
the platform operator itself may not know the matching criteria that its
algorithms employ. If Uber or Lyft’s algorithms direct drivers to pick up
White drivers more readily than African-American ones, there is no
conscious decision by a human that can be subject to enforcement actions
under anti-discrimination rules.399 In Lessig’s terms, there is a
transparency concern with the software-based regulatory modality, which
calls into question its superiority.
The proper response in such a situation is not necessarily to go back
to the traditional solutions. It is to examine ways to preserve the benefits
and efficiency of company-managed algorithmic reputation systems
while avoiding the transparency problems. For example, Nick Grossman
of venture capital firm Union Square Ventures sees the opportunity for a
“Regulation 2.0” paradigm that shifts from ex ante permission to ex post
data-driven accountability.400 He proposes that regulators exempt on394. See Thierer et al., supra note 282, at 25–42.
395. See id.
396. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 11 QUEUE 1, 10–14
(2013).
397. Id.
398. See Edelman et al., supra note 57, at 8–16.
399. This is not to say that such rules are always effective for traditional taxis. By eliminating
the opportunity for the driver to decide whether to pick someone up based on a visual scan of who
is standing on the corner and to later deny that racial bias was involved, the algorithmic systems
likely produce better results at preventing invidious discrimination. However, this should not free
them from scrutiny.
400. See Nick Grossman, White Paper: Regulation, the Internet Way, DATA-SMART CITY
SOLUTIONS (Apr. 8, 2015), http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulationthe-internet-way-660.
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demand companies from certain regulations if on-demand companies
provide a real-time data feed that demonstrates their compliance with
public policy mandates and the opportunity for regulators to audit their
behavior.401
Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb initially resisted requests for granular data that
could assist regulators.402 Yet they have begun to change their tune as
they recognize that voluntary disclosure may be superior to (and
potentially head off) direct regulation. Airbnb has begun sharing
anonymized data about its hosts with local regulators,403 and Uber makes
trip data available to cities.404 This real-time information would also
enable cities to engage in more sophisticated traffic management and
other public services, as a side benefit of the regulatory deal.405 By seeing
benefits in engagement with on-demand companies, local governments
may be able to develop “win-win” solutions.406 Transparency can be
addressed less intrusively through audits and reverse engineering of
outputs on test data sets.407
A regulatory regime based on transparency of activity data is likely to
be transparent as to its obligations (which is the sense in which Lessig
used the term), as well as well-calibrated in its obligations. Data-sharing
401. See Nick Grossman, Here’s the Solution to the Uber and Airbnb Problems—and No
One Will Like It, SLOW HUNCH (July 23, 2015), http://www.nickgrossman.is/2015/07/23/heresthe-solution-to-the-uber-and-airbnb-problems-and-no-one-will-like-it/.
402. See Aaron Bialick, Lyft and Uber Won’t Release Data to Shed Light on How They Affect
Traffic, STREETSBLOG SF (June 30, 2015), http://sf.streetsblog.org/2015/06/30/lyft-and-uberwont-release-data-to-shed-light-on-how-they-affect-traffic/; Kim-Mai Cutler, Airbnb and the
Problem of Data, TECHCRUNCH (June 11, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/06/11/airbnb-andthe-problem-of-data/.
403. See Isaac, supra note 201.
404. See Douglas Macmillan, Uber Offers Trip Data to Cities, Starting with Boston, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/13/uber-offers-trip-data-tocities-starting-in-boston/. Uber’s willingness to share data has not yet been universal. In
California, for example, it was fined for failure to meet mandates for data reporting. See David
Pierson, Uber Fined $7.6 Million by California Utilities Commission, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2016,
11:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-uber-puc-20160114-story.html.
405. Business professor Arun Sundarajaran and a colleague have called for a somewhat
similar process of “delegated regulation.” See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 377, at 129; see
also Emily Badger, What Happens When Uber and Airbnb Become Their Own Regulators, WASH.
POST (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/04/whathappens-when-uber-and-airbnb-become-their-own-regulators/.
406. See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Policy:
The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy,” 55 (George Mason Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 15-01 (2015)), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2549919.
407. See Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting
Discrimination on Internet Platforms, Data and Discrimination: Converting Critical Concerns into
Productive Inquiry 6 (May 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of
Michigan); Nicholas Diakopoulos, Rage Against the Algorithms, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/rage-against-the-algorithms/280255/.
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alone is not a complete solution to the range of legal issues the Internet
of the World generates. Its effectiveness should be judged in each context
based on effectiveness in achieving well-articulated public interest
objectives. The point is that there are more options than new companies
ignoring regulation and regulators blocking their operations. Both sides
of that debate are under the illusion of the digital dichotomy. Instead,
regulators need to define essential goals through open processes and
scrutinize new technologically driven means to achieve them. Even when
these regulatory innovations involve significant private action,
government involvement is often necessary.
Twenty years ago, innovative new online services provoked a wave
of cyberlibertarianism, a backlash of cyber-realism, and eventual
adoption of creative solutions with government actors playing enabling
roles. Technology entrepreneurs and their supporters eventually realized
that government was not only a potential impediment to growth and
innovation but a necessary facilitator of it. The same pattern is occurring
now. Cooperation between governmental and private actors is starting to
lead to workable compromises to address the important legal and
regulatory challenges of the nascent Internet of the World. As much as
digital technology changes the world, some things will always remain the
same.
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